

Security Council Committee

History

Created after World War II as an attempt to remedy the failures of the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has existed for the entirety of the UN and is now one of the six major bodies of the organization. As Article 1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) states, the first purpose of the UN is "[to] maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats..." It is the primary job of the SC to take substantive action on such issues of peace and security. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the SC has the full power to investigate any situation that might result in conflict and threaten international peace and security, and take subsequent action.

The UN Charter establishes the main functions of the SC as the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among states, cooperation to solve international disputes, and the promotion of human rights. While the SC operates as a single body, under Article 25 of the UN Charter it has the ability to establish subsidiary committees such as the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict, the Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees, the Sanctions Committees, Peacekeeping Operations, International Tribunals, and various Standing and Ad Hoc committees, which all operate to support the overarching mandate of the SC and are comprised of the current SC member state representation. Through coordination of these bodies, the SC is able to call for ceasefires, request discussions to resolve issues leading to conflict, and launch investigations into disputes or situations that may disrupt international peace.

The SC is made up of five permanent Member States (the P5): France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America; additionally, there are 10 non-permanent rotating Member States that are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The leaders of the victorious Allied countries following World War II hold the P5 seats. The P5 also hold veto power, which means they can prevent any substantive draft resolution from being adopted by the SC with a negative vote. The remaining 10 non-permanent Member States are chosen to represent the diverse geographical regions of the world, and do not hold veto power. Of these 15 Member States, each is granted the Presidency of the SC for a single month, serving on a rotating alphabetical basis. For any procedural change or resolution to pass in the SC, it must garner a total of at least nine votes. It is also important to recognize that under Article 25 of the UN Charter, the SC is the only committee in the UN that may issue legally binding decisions.

In 2014 alone, the SC has adopted resolutions on conflicts in Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, Sudan/South Sudan, Iran, Mali, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Kosovo, the Middle East, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. Aside from focusing on these immediate crises, the SC is also currently studying the long-term goal of global peace by publishing policy reports and resolutions on the thematic debates around terrorism, gender issues in combat, conflict in former colonial states, and general matters of peace and security. This represents a growing evolution of the body to shift focus away from only situational matters, and to also examine and discuss broader and more impactful thematic issues. These thematic approaches are rooted in resolutions proposing preventative measures, increased intelligence, comprehensive reactionary approaches, and usage of cross-body collaboration within the international community.

As one of the most prominent bodies of the UN, the SC is under constant scrutiny from the international community. One of the main criticisms has been the veto power of the P5 because it gives these Member States undue power to veto any resolutions that may conflict with their own interests and foreign policy, misrepresenting the views and needs of the majority. For instance, the recent vetoes from both China and Russia on the SC's resolution to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposing the referral, as well as the U.S.'s legacy of vetoing resolutions addressing the Palestinian question, have been particularly condemned by critics. Similarly, the membership of the P5 has been further critiqued for inaccurately assessing and assisting with the needs of Member States in the global south, as well as under representing Member States in the global south within SC membership itself. The SC's funding has also been a matter of debate, as it is funded independently from the UN budget and therefore may be at higher risk than other central UN bodies for financial bias influencing policies. As a result, the success of certain SC operations has been undermined by criticism of potential bias, and in this criticism, the SC loses some of the credibility it requires to operate and implement policy amongst Member States.

Though the SC is not a perfect institution, it remains indisputably relevant as a powerful force in the international community. With over 15 years of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone having been concluded in March 2014 after

regaining peace following the civil wars of the early 1990s, quick responses to poaching threats in central Africa, and its position as the international leader of the ICC's International Criminal Tribunals, the SC continues to make positive substantive impacts on the international community. Furthermore, its increased focus on thematic issues, as well as the movement towards its increased transparency, has ensured that the SC continues to involve itself in the most current state of global affairs. Amidst intense global pressures, cooperation and diplomacy are still of the utmost importance in the SC's dealings and are reflected throughout its work of protecting the world's population in the pursuit of international peace and security.

I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States

- What steps can the SC take to improve its responsiveness to crises in failed or fragile nascent states?
- What resources are required on the part of the international community and the UN to prevent crises from stalling and becoming full-scale conflicts?
- How can and should the SC adapt to ever-changing circumstances and the uncertainties that failed and fragile nascent states present?

While there is no internationally agreed-upon definition for a failed state, the overall consensus is that such states are often characterized by their inability to impose order or wield legitimate force due to a collapse of government, often resulting in a loss of territory and the creation of an unstable environment. A recent example of a failed state is Somalia prior to 2012. A fragile or fragile nascent state, while not as dysfunctional as a failed state, is nevertheless extremely susceptible to instability and is in constant danger of losing the ability to carry out basic political, security, and economic functions. Internal or regional conflicts, severe poverty, and generally weak institutions usually mire both. Fragile nascent states in particular are usually confronted with these obstacles due to severe political transition into a "new" government. Two current examples of fragile nascent states are South Sudan and Libya. When a state fails or becomes fragile, crises are not confined within its borders. In fact, unlike in situations of political unrest, the borders themselves may begin to grow blurry, as widespread fighting holds the possibility of transforming into a regional conflict, thereby threatening international peace, security, and stability. When such a situation arises, the United Nations (UN) must manage the crisis as swiftly as possible, using all tools at its disposal.

The situations many of these types of states and their citizens face are dire. Political infighting can result in an outbreak of militant violence or, in more dramatic cases, a coup d'état. Conflict is bred by these political differences in addition to extreme religious intolerance, which forces tens of thousands of citizens to flee their homes, frequently leading to mass migrations into refugee camps in neighboring states. As conflict continues to spread and intensify, these camps become increasingly overcrowded and are even targeted by armed groups involved in the conflicts. Governments are in severe disarray, meaning they cannot effectively protect their citizens from harm, nor can they provide them with basic living needs. The rule of law is often left under- or unenforced, and the crisis continues to worsen. In some cases, such as the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), transitional governments are set up to try and exercise as much influence and control as possible on its citizens and territory. If such a regime is not installed quickly enough, a chaotic environment is likely to ensue as armed groups and terrorist organizations vie and compete for power, territory, and resources.

Prevention and response are two ways in which the UN can manage crises in failed and fragile states. Development through rebuilding infrastructure and institutions offers a way to prevent against future violence, but it is much harder for administrations to make meaningful progress in this area while in the midst of intense armed conflict, especially with an extremely limited set of resources. Engagement with civil society is also an important component of this process, and often can be the difference between failure and success in crisis management. Crisis management takes many forms at the UN, but the responsibility of responding to crises is mainly tasked to the Security Council (SC), as laid out in Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945). Through a variety of different departments, agencies, and organizations, the SC coordinates and manages all urgent matters that would threaten international peace and security. Though there are a great many actors when it comes to crisis management in the UN, the SC is the biggest decision-maker, and as a result must weigh many different options at any given time. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are utilized for peacekeeping and field operations, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) serve as advisory bodies, and various regional offices and organizations are relied upon for their knowledge, expertise, and coordination. In an era when the UN is attempting to be more holistic and coherent as an organization, the job of the SC is made that much more difficult as it strives to incorporate all the necessary components into PKOs for the best possible chance of success. This new age of robust, multidimensional peacekeeping is a direct result of trial and error over the last two decades, and lessons learned are emerging at a rapid pace. The SC, struggling to keep up with this pace, must apply such lessons to their management of crises,

military or otherwise. One lesson learned and applied in this way was the realization of the significance of dedicated peacebuilding efforts, which led to the creation of the PBC in 2005. This was part of a major organizational restructuring of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and their administration with the idea that more comprehensive and broad approaches were needed.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding, two of the most significant aspects of crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states, at the UN are constantly being adapted to meet the needs of specific situations. Peacekeeping is one of the first, and most robust, tools employed by the SC as a form of crisis management in failed and fragile states, since it places a neutral force in the midst of conflict with the goal of defusing volatile situations before they intensify further. This is imperative to execute well for a diplomatic peace process to even begin. However, certain reforms are not only relevant but also outright necessary across all PKOs and peacebuilding operations if strides are to be made in facilitating more robust, multidimensional crisis management in these states. Three prominent reforms include engagement with civil society, inter-agency cooperation, and responsiveness. In failed or fragile states, in particular, reforms are even more necessary because terrorist and other organizations often seek to take advantage of the vacuum caused by the lack of a strong government or military presence that would otherwise halt conflict. Rapid and swift responsiveness is therefore the key in such situations, but lack of resources exacerbates and prolongs the problem, often dragging in additional regional and international actors that are forced to handle and confront the issue. The addition of more actors complicates matters further due to each respective interests, internal politics, and limitations, increasing the factors, which need to be considered by all parties involved before making any decisions on how to solve the crisis. All of these reforms and more are a product of reflections on the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s (Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia).

Along with engaging with civil society, civilian training and empowerment, delivered with a gender balance appropriate to the situation, engages local populations in not only assisting in rebuilding their governmental institutions, but also bringing about development to combat the underlying issue of poverty. In his 2013 report to the SC on women, and peace and security, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined several steps needed to achieve gender balanced reform, including the increased assignment of gender experts to all field operations and offices of his special representatives, as well as increasing the proportion of women in the uniformed components of peacekeeping and national security sector institutions. The expectation of such reforms is that a more balanced gender perspective mainstreamed throughout UN coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts will ensure that all citizens involved are represented and everyone's issues are addressed, so that peace is wholly and comprehensively sustainable.

Inter-agency cooperation is especially vital to crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states. Due to its similarity in mission and scope of operations in Africa, one of the UN's natural partners in maintaining international peace and security in that region is the European Union (EU). In 2003, the UN and the European Union signed the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management*, to mutually enhance each organization's planning, training, communication, and best practices in the areas of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and rapid deployment. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, however, overall EU operational contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have been lacking, with the exceptions of a rapid deployment force (EUFOR DRC) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006 and an ongoing mission (EUFOR République centrafricaine) in CAR since 2007. One major reason for this is the residual distrust of the effectiveness of UN PKOs after the failures of the 1990s. This partnership has not been as effective or constructive over the past decade; however, there are opportunities to explore in this partnership. One general suggestion has been to simply focus the nature of the cooperative relationship to create a more feasible and accomplishable agreement for crisis management. Another optimistic outlook is that the newly established European External Action Service will serve as a more concrete and reliable component in joint operations with the UN, perhaps inspiring the UN to create a similar organ modeled after it in the future. Since there is already a strong financial link in place between the two organizations (with the EU providing over 1/3 of the budget for UN PKOs in 2013), and considering the fact that UN PKOs have become much more comprehensive and robust in recent years, it is likely that UN-EU cooperation in crisis management will continue for the foreseeable future, perhaps even growing closer and more focused. This collaboration remains crucial in the endeavor of improving the responsiveness and efficacy of missions in fragile states.

Responsiveness is another key area for reform in crisis management. Rapid response forces, or troops that are capable of being deployed promptly in the event of an emergency, are a popular idea for how to reform the SC's responsiveness to situations that can change suddenly. These forces are favored over peacekeeping missions due to their ability to respond to crises within days rather than weeks or months. Speed is one of the most important factors in deploying these types of forces to failed or fragile states, as a crisis can become a conflict in a much shorter amount of time than would normally be expected in relatively stable Member States. One current example of a rapid response force, though not yet a fully operational one, is the African Union's (AU) African Standby Force (ASF).

While the AU had hoped to achieve full operational capability by 2015, an assessment published by an AU Independent Panel of Experts predicts that major changes would have to take place for this to occur. Challenges include the lack of a framework between the ASF and the regional economic communities in Africa (into which regional standby forces are assigned under the ASF), as well as the severe lack of logistics and regional depots throughout the continent. Such a rapid response force, however, could serve as a model for the SC if it attempts to create a similar organization. Also, with the additional resources of the UN and UN Member States, these forces could potentially garner greater success than the ASF. Through such an idea there is substantial room for UN-AU inter-agency cooperation as many of the PKOs overseen by the SC are deployed in Africa and could largely benefit from assistance and coordination with a fully operational ASF or other form of rapid response force.

This pattern of reform and transformation of PKOs in failed and fragile nascent states still continues and has drastically changed since the failures of the 1990s. The current discussion involving failed or fragile nascent states has very recent roots as a thematic issue in the Security Council. Most recently this topic was brought up as a major discussion point at the annual SC retreat from 21-22 April 2014, and focused primarily on the situations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and South Sudan. In April 2014, the SC established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will take the place of a current, AU-led PKO in September 2014. Mandated to protect civilians from harm while supporting the transitional government, MINUSCA is the latest in a string of multidimensional PKOs created by the SC to either replace or augment existing forces, or address a sudden crisis which requires a robust and multifaceted response. In the latter situations, these PKOs are created in lieu of a rapid response force, since there currently is not one in place. While these PKOs indeed have begun to improve the gender balance and involve civil society more than in the past, a reliable and feasible UN rapid response force is not yet a reality. The funding of troops and troop contribution to such a force are key issues when discussing its feasibility, and will continue to be relevant in future talks involving crisis management and multidimensional peacekeeping.

The current crisis in the CAR illustrates well the obstacles that the SC faces in managing crisis situations in failed and fragile nascent states. UN PKOs exist in several similar situations with varying resources, partnerships, funding, and mandates, the weakness or lack of which can mean the difference between progress and intractability of a crisis. The SC must continue to renew peacekeeping missions' mandates on their merits and accomplishments, and remain adaptable to the ever-changing situation on the ground. The SC's capacity for crisis management in failed or fragile nascent states is being tested with each new situation. New advances around precise strategies, particularly in relation to civilian engagement, gender balance, and rapid responsiveness will continue to develop in the next several years and must remain at the forefront of the SC's ongoing debate to address challenges more holistically. But as it stands today, the progress on this issue serves as a solid framework for the future of crisis management at the UN, keeping the particularly unique and difficult needs of both failed and fragile nascent states in mind.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the United Nations Security Council

United Nations. (26 June 1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

There is no more comprehensive document to examine the mandates of both the UN and the SC. The Charter establishes the purpose and goals of the SC and states where limits on its power may lie. Articles 1 and 25, as well as Chapter VI, may prove particularly useful to delegates, as these chapters define how the SC implements legislative power in the international community, and they will enable delegates to research the source of the SC's power and ability to create legally binding resolutions.

United Nations, Security Council. (2014). *About* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/> *The key Website to understanding the work of the SC, this site goes from explaining the basic mechanisms of the SC, including membership and presidency, to examining its overarching Programme of Work. Under the "Documents" section is the entirety of all previous SC resolutions and statements, including letters and press reports, which will prove highly useful to any research on the SC. Delegates should view the information about "Subsidiary Organs" and "Meetings" for the most recent information on the SC's mandate and actions.*

United Nations, Security Council. (18 June 2014). *Provisional Programme of Work of the Security Council – June* 4

2014. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/powmonthly.pdf>

While short, this document shows the entire program of work and agenda of the SC throughout the month of June 2014. It provides reference to the consultations and briefings that have occurred with individual Member States and UN bodies, and also explains which reports will be published on which dates. Furthermore, this report lists the current areas of crisis and thematic debates occurring within the SC at this time. Delegates will find this very useful when studying the most current overall themes, policy developments, and collaborations between the SC and other UN bodies.

I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States

African Union, Peace and Security Department. (November 2010). *African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study*. Retrieved from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf>

This study essentially can be used as a progress report on the whole of the peace and security framework for the African Union. While the sections on the African Standby Force are especially relevant to this topic, the entire document will be a hugely useful and informative read for delegates in their preparation. Delegates should pay special attention to the challenges and subsequent recommendations outlined in each subsection mentioning the African Standby Force, and reflect on how it can apply to the SC and crisis management. Delegates should also be aware of an assessment report concerning the full operational capability of the African Standby Force in 2015, which will be prepared by an African Union independent panel of experts by July 2014.

Security Council Report. (May 2014). *Monthly Forecast: May 2014*. Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/2014_05_forecast.pdf

This Monthly Forecast publication is an extremely valuable resource for delegates to become acquainted with all the proceedings of the SC in one place. Not only does it provide snapshots of current situations that the SC is discussing, it outlines the probable outcomes of all pending resolutions, reports, and decisions. It is clearly organized and labeled, and offers an excellent starting place for research on any one of the topics being considered by the SC.

Thürer, D. (1999). The “Failed State” and International Law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 836. Retrieved from: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htm>

This article, while written 15 years ago and not directly from a security perspective, provides a good background of both failed and fragile states. It has solid narratives for the SC’s history with failed states that delegates may find useful to develop their background knowledge on the subject. The references section may also be a suitable location to find other leads on the subject for further study and research.

United Nations, Security Council, 7153rd Meeting. (10 April 2014). *Resolution 2149*. Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149(2014))

This resolution is the latest action from the SC on the subject of the CAR. Of particular interest are the operatives that detail the new Transitional Government in the CAR, as well as the transition from the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). Delegates should familiarize themselves with this resolution, as well as its counterparts, Security Council resolution 2158 of 29 May 2014 and Security Council resolution 2132 of 24 December 2013, relating respectively to the missions in Somalia and South Sudan, to be up-to-date on the failed or fragile nascent states in focus in this guide.

United Nations, Security Council, 7168th meeting. (2 May 2014). *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (S/PV.7168)* [Provisional Record]. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7168

This is a verbatim meeting record of the SC’s consideration of the situation in the Sudan and South Sudan. There is a first-hand report delivered in several speeches to the SC detailing the atrocities being carried out in South Sudan, as well as an in-depth update on the events that transpired at a UN peacekeeping base in the country. Delegates are encouraged to read as much

of this record as they can, as it provides a different medium of conveying what is happening on the ground in a fragile nascent state.

Annotated Bibliography

Charter of the United Nations. (1945). Retrieved 4 from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> *Given that the Security Council is a principal organ of the United Nations, delegates should read the Charter of the United Nations to learn about its mandate, structure, and function. The Charter will give delegates the most detailed and comprehensive background available on the Security Council. Delegates will be able to complete detailed research on actions the Security Council can take and how the Security Council works within the larger United Nations system when forming their own recommendations by reading the Charter of the United Nations.*

Security Council Report. (2015). *About the UN Security Council* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/about-the-un-security-council.php>

The Security Council Report is a non-profit organization which provides monthly, analytical reports on the work of the Security Council. Their summary of the Security Council is a good starting point for delegates wishing to find a succinct review of the Council's activities. Delegates will be able to find information on membership, working methods, use of vetoes, subsidiary bodies, and history of peacekeeping missions and sanctions detailed in this report. This Website is foundational so delegates gain a broader understanding of the Security Council, before proceeding with more precise and detailed research.

United Nations. (2015). *Highlights of Security Council Practice 2014*. SCPCRB/SCAD/DPA/United Nations. Retrieved 4 May 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/highlights/2014.pdf>

This is a document produced annually by the United Nations to give a broader overview of the Security Council's work. Delegates will find this to be an invaluable resource on trends in the Security Council's program of work and will get a good sense of the type and amount of work the Council does. This document is very easy to understand as it breaks down the Security Council's work into different graphs and diagrams. Delegates will understand the current state of the Security Council very quickly, and it is an excellent source to begin research on the modern Security Council.

United Nations Security Council. (2015). *The Security Council* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/>

This is the Website of the Security Council, which is regularly updated and will provide the latest information on relevant activities. Delegates will find this to be an invaluable resource for all stages of their research. Not only does the Website provide information on the structure, mandate, and current work of the Security Council, it also includes links to all Security Council resolutions, meeting records, reports, and presidential statements, so delegates will be able to access the most up to date work of the Security Council. Additionally, the Website includes links to documents on trends in the Security Council, mandate components of different missions, and information on subsidiary organs of the Security Council.

II. Preventing Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

“Let us remember that you are here not simply to avoid a nuclear nightmare, but to build a safer world for all.”

- How can the international community increase confidence-building measures in order to advance Member State consensus to prevent the terrorist acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)?
- What methods can the international community use to ensure access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while still monitoring production of hazardous materials?
- Can organizations that combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs coordinate their policy goals?

Introduction

Globally, terrorism has pervasively impacted peace and security. Whether referring to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, or the suicide bombings perpetrated by Boko Haram militants in Nigeria, countless individuals fall victim to grave terrorist attacks each year. These attacks, while executed without WMDs, were debilitating and negatively impacted the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of individuals. The widespread effects of terrorism are unfathomable, and thus, preventing the terrorist acquisition of WMDs, a more lethal form of weaponry, is of the utmost importance. Without proper preventative action, international security will be undermined and the terrorist acquisition of WMDs will be imminent.

The issue of terrorism remains a point of contention globally, as various conceptions of the term complicate policymaking surrounding the issue. The UN has set forth extensive work attempting to address both terrorism and WMDs. Much of the work has been done in isolation, however, as opposed to collectively addressing both terrorism and WMDs. Several notable incidents of the terrorist acquisition of WMDs have occurred, such as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo, Japan, where lethal nerve gas was deployed in the Tokyo subway system leading to the deaths of 19 people as well as numerous injuries. Likewise, the emergence of the A.Q. Khan network in 2004, and the alleged proliferation and sales of WMD technology on the black market, was equally concerning and introduced a new dimension of peril to be considered by policy makers. The insidious nature of terrorist networks, coupled with the proliferation of WMDs, is a threat to international peace and security and must be addressed.

There are three types of WMDs, including, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) describes nuclear weapons as “the most dangerous weapon on earth.” A single detonation of a nuclear weapon can wipe out an entire city, kill millions of people, and destroy the environment and livelihood of future generations through the long-term effects. Likewise, biological weapons are highly destructive. The UN defines biological weapons as “complex systems that disseminate disease-causing organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants.” Lastly, chemical weapons, also lethal, are defined as “toxic chemicals contained in a delivery system, such as a bomb or shell.” All WMDs are highly dangerous and thus preventing their proliferation must be given precedence in international policy considerations.

International and Regional Framework

The UN has striven to prevent the spread and deployment of WMDs by initiating numerous treaties. Some of the treaties include the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) of 1970, the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction* (BWC) of 1972, the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC) of 1993, and the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (CTBT) of 1996. Collectively, states established these treaties to mitigate the risks of the proliferation of WMDs. However, the treaties are state centric and the impact of the aforementioned treaties on non-state actors, such as terrorists, has not been adequately considered and addressed.

In order to address the threat of the proliferation of WMDs, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created in 1957, has hosted numerous security conferences and implemented the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database in an effort to analyze and prevent further proliferation. The IAEA is worth noting as it monitors States Parties’ compliance with the NPT. The NPT forbids the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provides assistance to states possessing nuclear materials with storage and security of material. This established infrastructure is crucial in ensuring that nuclear material is not accessible to non-state actors, thus providing safeguards against the terrorist acquisition of nuclear capabilities.

In addition, organizations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) serve as a

first line of defense, preventing the spread of chemical weaponry. For instance, the CWC established three grades of chemical materials. This system regulates the usage of potentially hazardous chemical materials thus preventing their misuse. Likewise, similar to how the NPT provides state assistance for storing hazardous nuclear material, the OPCW provides a framework for chemical products thus safeguarding and tracking the material.

It is noteworthy that conventions in place for biological weapons, including the BWC, lack oversight in regard to implementation. While still highly dangerous, biological weapons are considered extremely difficult to obtain, thus, less of a threat to international peace and security. However, that does not mean that this form of weaponry should be taken lightly. In fact, organizations such as the UNODA work toward increasing universality of the BWC. However, much of the responsibility regarding safeguarding biological threats falls on each individual Member State.

The UN also has a long-standing involvement combating terrorism globally. In 1972, following the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the issue of terrorism made its way on to the agenda of the UN General Assembly at the urging of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. In fact, the UN has established “16 international instruments that criminalize nearly every imaginable terrorist offense and facilitate international legal cooperation.” The outcome has created a legal basis and international strategy for combating terrorism.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Member States have taken steps against militant non-state actor groups in an effort to combat terrorism. However, these efforts have not been without consequences. The root causes of terrorism, identified by the High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change as “despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression and human rights abuse” are often exacerbated in these anti-terrorism efforts. When a state fails to uphold fundamental human rights in their counter terrorism efforts, terrorist networks often bolster recruitment efforts by targeting individuals who fall victim to human rights violations.

In addition to actions taken by Member States, the GA has also bolstered efforts through initiatives such as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, set out in resolution 60/288. This effort synthesizes all existing counter-terrorism resolutions and treaties into a single document that is universally accepted by all Member States. Additionally, this strategy “underscores the need for all states to respect human rights and promote the rule of law while fighting terrorism.” However, much preventative work remains to be done to bridge the gap between anti-terrorism policy and WMDs.

Various regional organizations, such as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America (UNLIREC), other regional organizations, along with many non-UN entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), combat issues of terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. These organizations can be used as a good point of reference during the research process in uncovering the relationship between terrorism and ensuring the non-proliferation of WMDs.

Role of the International System

The Security Council

The SC leads international counter-terrorism efforts. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the SC adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which combats terrorism by restricting all forms of fiscal support by states to terrorist organizations. Likewise, it requires all states participate in inter-governmental information sharing regarding potential attacks and to fully prosecute terrorists and their supporters. Based off of article seven of the resolution, addressing threats to international peace and security, the SC initiated the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). This committee tracks state compliance to the principles set forth in the guidelines. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity surrounding the definition of terrorism continues to be an obstacle, stunting substantial progress in disarmament.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America and subsequent global terrorist attacks, the international community enhanced its understanding of terrorist objectives regarding the acquisition of WMDs. Guided by Article 26 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, the SC adopted resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004. This resolution requires collaboration of all Member States to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and monitor their stockpiles.

Resolution 1540 also established the 1540 Committee to stamp out further proliferation of WMDs, including the spread of these weapons to non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. This committee consists of all 15

members of the SC and is divided into four sub-working groups. The working groups include: Monitoring and National Implementation; Assistance; Cooperation with International Organizations; and Transparency and Media Outreach. The purpose of this committee is to assist with implementation of SC resolution 1540 through the working group of experts under certain stipulations, such as disallowing direct assistance and funding. However, this committee also manages a database (matrices) that essentially monitors each state's progress toward the implementation of this resolution. This matrix was initiated in 2005 and is certainly not without its critics. One such critic, Pakistan, stipulated that the SC is a poor representation of the international community and refused to allow inspections from the committee. On 27 April 2006 the SC expanded the scope of the 1540 Committee by adopting resolution 1673, which reestablished the original objectives and bolstered its efforts to advocate full implementation of the resolution. In November 2008, the SC held an open thematic debate on bolstering global security through regulation and the reduction of armaments. Today, the SC continues to combat both terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs.

Various obstacles have emerged regarding the progress of the 1540 Committee. One primary source of skepticism emerged from the fact that not all Member States agree that the acquisition of WMDs by terrorists should be their top priority. Another obstacle includes the responsibility of states to implement the resolution. While this can be viewed as a positive with regard to sovereignty, alternatively, many "resource challenges have impeded compliance" of states.

Other United Nations Actions

The GA First Committee has also played a crucial role in the eradication of the proliferation of WMDs through various resolutions. Some of these include GA resolutions 57/83, 59/80 and the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, 59/290. However, the ambiguity of defining terrorism has posed serious challenges to the progress of the committee. Other organizations that play a significant role in the international system include The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, and the UNODA. These organizations are excellent resources for uncovering details regarding existing disarmament and non-proliferation framework.

Conclusion

Looking forward, when considering a countries respective position on preventing the terrorist acquisition of WMDs, it is important to bear in mind the role of SC in upholding international peace and security and preempting escalation of conflict. While the world has yet to see a terrorist attack utilizing WMDs on a mass scale, it is imperative to vigilantly address this issue and save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Annotated Bibliography

Arms Control Association. (2015). *The Nuclear Security Summit* [Report]. Retrieved from: http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_NSS_Report_2015.pdf

The Arms Control Association created a report that tracks key metrics for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit of 2016. This report investigates over a dozen joint statements stipulated at the Nuclear Security Summit of 2014 and monitors their progress. Likewise, it details various state commitments to nuclear security and disarmament. Moreover, state progress regarding the commitments is also analyzed. This will be useful in the research process as it details agenda items that are in need of consideration when framing a countries position on disarmament, and the implementation of SC resolution 1540.

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-ninth Session. (2014). *Measures to Prevent Terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction: Report of the Secretary-General (A/69/138)* [Report]. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/138

The serious implications of terrorists' acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction are the central theme of this report. Likewise, this report outlines comprehensive and achievable measures to be taken in order to prevent terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction. These measures include: bolstering pertinent national security policies, restricting hazardous material usage and controlling related technologies. Moreover, General Assembly Resolution 68/41 of 2014 is discussed, which establishes universal measures preventing the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorists. Additionally, selected state responses to this plan are outlined in this report, thus providing invaluable insights into this topic.

United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2015). *Disarmament Issues* [Website]. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs investigates international security ranging from Weapons of Mass Destruction, acts of terrorism, to overall disarmament. This website details various committees' actions towards disarmament of Small Arms and Light Weapons as well as Weapons of Mass Destruction. Likewise, this website also links to a database of relevant General Assembly resolutions, disarmament treaties, state military expenditures as well as the global reported arms trade. In addition there are various resources that will assist with the research process when framing a country's position on this multi-faceted topic.

United Nations, Security Council. (2015). *Counter-Terrorism Committee* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/>

This resource is highly relevant and provides crucial background information on the terrorism component of this topic. This committee was created by the Security Council via Resolution 1373 in 2001 and specifically works to address the growing international threat of terrorism. Likewise, it serves as a support network to Member States countering terrorism. Additionally, this resource provides comprehensive information regarding the international legal protocol and procedures that have been adopted in order to address this issue.

United Nations, Treaty Collection. (2015). *Text and Status of the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism* [Website]. Retrieved from: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml

The United Nations Treaty Collection provides a listing of pertinent resolutions and treaties related to terrorism. This website provides comprehensive information regarding signatories, sponsors and the current status of each treaty. It is important for delegates to consider related treaties, their scope, and understand to which treaties their assigned Member State subscribes.