

Committee Overview

Introduction

The Security Council (SC) is a principal organ of the United Nations (UN) and is charged with maintaining international peace and security.¹ The SC was created when the victors of World War II created, signed, and ratified the *Charter of the United Nations* in 1945.² The SC's structure is indicative of the balance of power at the end of World War II as the Allied Powers agreed to its formation during the waning years of the war.³ The SC first met on 17 January 1946 in London and deployed its first peacekeeping mission in 1948 to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its neighbors.⁴ During the Cold War, the SC was largely ineffective due to continuous disagreements between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, later the Russian Federation, which as permanent members could veto each other's proposals.⁵ Since the late 1980s, the SC has become more active and had a greater presence in the international arena with more than 80% of peacekeeping missions deployed since 1988.⁶ Given its distinctive mandate and structure, the SC is unique in its position of having the tools necessary to take action during security and humanitarian crises.⁷ The SC: adopts legally binding resolutions that Member States are obligated to carry out; authorizes the use of force including missions and sanctions regimes; and oversees peacekeeping and political missions by renewing and updating their mandates.⁸

Governance, Structure and Membership

The SC originally consisted of 11 members and was expanded to its current membership of 15 members in 1965 to better reflect the new post-colonial membership of the UN.⁹ The SC currently consists of five permanent and 10 non-permanent members.¹⁰ The General Assembly (GA) elects the 10 non-permanent members for two-year terms based on geographic distribution with five from Africa or Asia, two from Latin America, one from Eastern Europe, and two from Western Europe or other areas.¹¹ The current non-permanent members are: Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela.¹² The People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America compose the five permanent members (also known as the P5) and have veto power.¹³ In order to adopt a resolution, nine members must vote in favor, and all of the permanent members must either vote in favor or abstain.¹⁴ Use of the veto is infrequent, and 56 of the 64 resolutions adopted by the SC in 2015 were unanimous.¹⁵ Member States that are not part of the SC may be invited to participate, without a vote, in debates that affect them and where their input is relevant.¹⁶

Mandate, Functions and Powers

In accordance with Article 24 of the *Charter of the United Nations* the SC is "mandated to act on behalf of all members of the UN to 'ensure prompt and effective action' with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁷ This includes: developing friendly relations among states; solving international problems and

¹ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Article 1; UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016.

² UN Foundation, *The UN Security Council*, 2012.

³ United States Department of State, *The Formation of the United Nations*, 1945.

⁴ UN Foundation, *The UN Security Council*, 2012; UN Peacekeeping, *History of peacekeeping*, 2016.

⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2013.

⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2013.

⁷ UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016.

⁸ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2013.

¹⁰ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5.

¹¹ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5; Encyclopedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2013.

¹² UN Security Council, *Current Members*, 2016.

¹³ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ UN Security Council, *Highlights of Security Council Practice 2014*, 2016.

¹⁶ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5.

¹⁷ UN Security Council, *About*, 2016.

promoting respect for human rights; and harmonizing the actions of states.¹⁸ The SC is unique in that it is the only UN body which can make legally binding decisions under Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations*.¹⁹ There are three levels of action the SC can take to respond to a threat to international peace and security.²⁰ Usually the SC will first recommend a peaceful solution to the conflict.²¹ First level actions include recommending principles for a peace agreement, carrying out investigation and mediation measures, creating a mission or a special envoy, and requesting help from the Secretary-General (SG).²² If hostilities are already taking place, the SC can issue ceasefire directives, send military observers, or create a peacekeeping mission to separate combatants and build conditions conducive for peaceful negotiations.²³ The SC can also use stronger enforcement measures including sanctions, arms embargos, travel bans, blockades, and military action, should the situation require it.²⁴ Additionally, the SC can affect UN membership, recommending suspending or expelling a Member State, but such action is unprecedented.²⁵

To fulfill its functions, the SC has created several subsidiary organs, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Peacebuilding Commission.²⁶ Sanctions committees are also established for each regime along with a Group of Experts.²⁷ The SC can also establish and modify peacekeeping and political missions.²⁸ Peacekeeping missions are led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and consist of military, police, and civilian personnel provided by willing troop contributing countries.²⁹ Peacekeeping is a flexible tool to provide security, political support, and early peacebuilding support, including: facilitating the political process through elections; restoring the rule of law; protecting and promoting human rights; assisting in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; and protecting civilians.³⁰ Political missions often take over for peacekeeping missions, especially following the signing of peace agreements, and are overseen by the Department of Political Affairs.³¹ They work on conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding.³²

There are several actions the SC can take to ensure it has the information and means necessary to act. It can request briefings by the UN Secretariat whenever needed to provide more specific information and updates.³³ The SC can request reports from the Secretariat or any of its subsidiary organs on missions, country situations, and recommendations on further action.³⁴ It can hold private meetings, including meetings with troop-contributing countries and Arria-formula meetings, to receive additional information.³⁵ Arria-formula meetings are a relatively new practice of the SC in which members meet confidentially and informally with whomever they chose to invite.³⁶ The SC can also issue presidential statements, which are official documents adopted at SC meetings.³⁷ Although not legally binding, presidential statements reflect consensus among SC members and are, therefore, a significant reflection of international opinion.³⁸ While the SC submits annual reports to the GA, it does not call on it for action.³⁹ The SC will often request action from Member States, parties to conflict, the SG, and itself.⁴⁰

¹⁸ UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016.

¹⁹ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 25; Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: Chapter VII*, 2013.

²⁰ UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016; *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016; *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 7.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 2; UN Repertoire of the Practice of the SC, *Membership in the UN*, 2016.

²⁶ UN Security Council, *Subsidiary Organs*, 2016; *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5.

²⁷ UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview*, 2016.

²⁸ UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2016.

²⁹ UN Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Operations*, 2016.

³⁰ UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2016.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² UN DPA, *Field Operations and Good Offices Missions*, 2016.

³³ UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2010/507)*, 2010, pp. 3, 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 12.

³⁶ UN Security Council, *Working Methods Handbook*, 2002.

³⁷ UN Security Council, *Presidential Statements*, 2016.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. 5.

⁴⁰ Repertoire of the Practice of the SC, *Agenda Items in 2010-2011 (Part I of the Repertoire)*, 2016.

Recent Sessions and Current Priorities

The SC meets continuously, meaning representatives must always be at headquarters in New York City, and it has a cyclical program of work, barring any emergency meetings.⁴¹ It considers each item on its agenda on a regular cycle of reviewing reports, meeting on issues, and renewing mandates every few months to one year, depending on the agenda item.⁴² In 2015, the SC adopted 64 resolutions and issued 26 presidential statements, 13 notes, and 36 letters by its President.⁴³ Geographically, 22.7 % of the decisions were on topics in the Middle East and 66.7 % focused on African states.⁴⁴ The SC also maintained its practice of including cross-cutting topics.⁴⁵ In particular, a focus was placed on the Protection of Civilians (POC), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC).⁴⁶ In fact, 79% of resolutions and statements issued by the SC on a topic that was country or regional specific held at least one provision on POC, 59% on WPS and 48% on CAAC.⁴⁷

The Middle East has been a consistent area of focus for the SC. In particular, violence between Palestine and Israel continues to escalate.⁴⁸ The goal of reaching a two-state solution remains feasible: however, as noted by the SG's Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, trust must be rebuilt between the parties, and the goal of a peaceful resolution for every party involved, must remain the end goal.⁴⁹ Similarly, diplomatic efforts in Iran remained a top priority for the SC and culminated in a unanimously adopted resolution endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the topic of the Iranian nuclear issue.⁵⁰ The SC continues to receive on-going updates on the situation in Syria.⁵¹ At the 7624th meeting, the SC unanimously adopted resolution 2268 (2016) endorsing the cessation of hostilities in the region.⁵² This agreement put forward clear steps to begin reducing the violence in Syria, although it does not apply to terrorist organizations such as Jabhat-al-Nusrah or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which continue to cause disruptions in the region.⁵³ Accordingly, the threat of terrorism has been an on-going topic of discussion within the SC. In particular, focus has been placed on barring terrorist organizations from acquiring funds through smuggling oil and gas and trafficking cultural artefacts from the region.⁵⁴ Likewise, SG Ban Ki-moon has noted the importance of addressing recruitment techniques used by these groups, including the use of the internet to attract new followers.⁵⁵ In February the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs presented the Council with the first report of the SG on the threat of ISIL to peace and security in the region.⁵⁶

Conclusion

The SC currently has 16 peacekeeping and 11 political missions on four continents in addition to ongoing sanctions regimes.⁵⁷ In the past, the SC has completed successful peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, El Salvador,

⁴¹ UN Security Council, *Provisional Rules of Procedure, 2016*, Ch. 1; UN DPA, *Security Council Reporting and mandate cycles, 2016*.

⁴² UN DPA, *Security Council Reporting and mandate cycles, 2016*; UN Security Council, *Highlights of Security Council Practice 2014, 2016*.

⁴³ UN Security Council, *Highlights of Security Council Practice 2014, 2016*.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ UN DPI, *Briefing Security Council, Special Coordinator for Middle East Peace Process Urges Move Beyond 'Mere Condemnations' in Seeking Best Way to Peace, 2016*.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ UN Security Council, *Resolution 2231 (2015): Background, 2015*.

⁵¹ UN DPI, *Security Council Endorses Syria Cessation of Hostilities Accord, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2268 (2016), 2016*.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ UN DPI, *Speakers Focus on Online Recruitment Activity, Need to Implement Relevant Resolutions as Security Council Debates Threat of Global Terrorism, 2016*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ UN DPI, *ISIL Still Threatens International Peace, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Calling for 'Unity and Action' to Combat Extremist Group, 2016*.

⁵⁷ UN Peacekeeping, *Current peacekeeping operations, 2016*; UN DPA, *Field Operations and Good Offices Missions, 2016*.

Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan.⁵⁸ As the SC continues to face emerging challenges in the world and shifts in its own internal structure, it will need to find new ways to use its working methods to respond to developing threats to international peace and security, including non-state armed groups, mass displacement, issues of women and children in conflict, and the potential for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

⁵⁸ UN Peacekeeping, *Successes in Peacekeeping*, 2016.

I. International Counter-Terrorism Measures

*“Missiles may kill terrorists. But, I am convinced that good governance is what will kill terrorism”.*⁵⁹

Introduction

Addressing the complications and negative effects of terrorism is an issue that the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has been debating for decades, beginning with resolution 1189 in 1998.⁶⁰ In spite of early counter-terrorism efforts, al-Qaeda was able to carry out the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States.⁶¹ As a result, the SC created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).⁶² The CTC, aided by the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, empowers Member States to combat terrorism within their borders.⁶³ The international community has put forth continuous efforts to combat terrorism, despite a lack of consensus on a specific definition of terrorism.⁶⁴ In lieu of a formally accepted definition, the SC accepted loosely defined actions that are considered terrorism outlined in the unanimously adopted resolution 1566 on *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts* in 2004.⁶⁵ Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta, the President of the SC and Egypt’s Ambassador to the UN, recently stated that “terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all [states], international and regional organizations and civil society as appropriate, to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist threat, consistent with the *United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*.”⁶⁶ The same strategy was mirrored by the General Assembly (GA) with the creation of its own specialized task force.⁶⁷ Through the efforts of these UN agencies, counter-terrorism measures have increased and remain ever-vigilant in addressing international terrorism as made evident through the adoption of the global strategy.⁶⁸

International and Regional Framework

Since 1963, there have been 19 internationally adopted documents to prevent acts of terrorism.⁶⁹ Each document was created under the auspices of either a UN entity or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁷⁰ Within those legal instruments, the UN and IAEA have addressed terrorist acts in many of its forms.⁷¹ These international documents include conventions and protocols such as the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons* (1999), the *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings* (1997), and the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (1999).⁷² These documents address terrorism concerning civil aviation, maritime means, and nuclear facilities.⁷³ More importantly, the legal instruments officially criminalize many acts of terrorism and express state’s rights in addressing them.⁷⁴

The SC has expressed its condemnation of terrorist acts for over a decade, beginning with resolution 1189 (1998) which addressed bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that killed hundreds of people.⁷⁵ The same perspective toward

⁵⁹ UN DPI, *Missiles May Kill Terrorists, But I Am Convinced That Good Governance Will Kill Terrorism*, Secretary-General Says at General Assembly Thematic Debate (SG/SM/16691-GA/11636), 2015.

⁶⁰ UN Security Council, *On The International Terrorism (S/RES/1189 (1998))*, 1998.

⁶¹ UN CTC, *Our Mandate*, 2016.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ UN DPI, *Agreed Definition of Term ‘Terrorism’ said to be needed for Consensus on Completing Comprehensive Convention against It (G/L/3276)*, 2005.

⁶⁵ UN Security Council, *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts (S/RES/1566 (2004))*, 2004.

⁶⁶ UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2016/6)*, 2016.

⁶⁷ UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*, 2016.

⁶⁸ UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2016/6)*, 2016.

⁶⁹ UN Action to Counter Terrorism, *International Legal Instruments*, 2016.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ UN Security Council, *On The International Terrorism (S/RES/1189 (1998))*, 1998.

terrorism and fear of its ability to destroy international peace and security was echoed through resolution 1267 of 1999 which addressed terrorist activities in Afghanistan.⁷⁶ Additionally, resolution 1269 of 1999 “unequivocally condemns” terrorist acts and stressed the need for all Member States to uphold the guidelines of international conventions that address terrorism to which they are party.⁷⁷ While intensifying efforts to combat terrorism, the SC adopted resolution 1373 which strongly addresses the financing of terrorist operations.⁷⁸ In this resolution, the SC empowers states to suppress, freeze, and seize funds that are associated with or used to assist terrorists or terrorist organizations and actions.⁷⁹ In addition to the seizing of funds, the SC declared that any person or persons associated with the financial support of terrorists should be denied safe haven and undergo criminal punishment.⁸⁰ In 2005 the SC unanimously adopted resolution 2199 which condemns all trade with Al-Qaida or any affiliated or like-minded organizations.⁸¹ In 2014 it was learned by Iraqi authorities that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had made a safe haven outside of the Iraqi borders, resulting in resolution 2249, which urges Member States to send resources to seize ISIL’s funds and eliminate their safe havens within the region.⁸²

The GA has also taken measures to address terrorism. In 1991 the GA adopted resolution 49/60 which “unequivocally condemns” terrorism in all forms.⁸³ Another issue that the resolution addresses is the safe release of hostages.⁸⁴ The work of the GA, the SC, and discussions from the 2005 World Summit Outcome culminated in *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* of September 2006.⁸⁵ The strategy is a unique foundational framework for the UN because its adoption was the first time the GA agreed on a common operational and strategic approach to combating terrorism.⁸⁶ Within the strategy, the GA addressed measures for identifying and addressing conditions that incite or spread terrorism; measures to prevent or combat terrorism; capacity building for Member States so they can combat and prevent terrorism; and respecting human rights when addressing issues of terrorism.⁸⁷ The implementation of this strategy by all Member States, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and regional bodies is in line with the plan of the GA to actively combat terrorism.⁸⁸ In 2015, the GA adopted four resolutions focused on counter-terrorism.⁸⁹ On 14 December 2015, the GA adopted *Measures to eliminate international terrorism*, which emphasizes the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as a best means of combating terrorism.⁹⁰ In addition, the resolution further highlights SC resolution 1373 and reiterates the role of Member States in combating terrorism both nationally and regionally.⁹¹

Role of the International System

The CTC was created by the SC resolution 1373 in 2001 in order to monitor the overall implementation of resolution 1373 and ensure that efforts to stop financial support for terrorist organizations and other counter-terrorism efforts are successful.⁹² With resolution 1535 of 2004 the SC created the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to assist carry out the policy decisions made by the CTC, conduct Member State assessments, and provide technical assistance for Member States.⁹³ Since then, the CTC and CTED have had several joint special meetings concerning the implementation of 1373 and other special topics.⁹⁴ Within these special

⁷⁶ UN Security Council, *On The Situation in Afghanistan (S/RES/1267 (1999))*, 1999.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*, 2001.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2199 (2015))*, 2015.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ UN General Assembly, *Measures to eliminate international terrorism (A/RES/46/51)*, 1991.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

⁸⁶ UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.

⁸⁷ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ UN General Assembly, *Resolutions*, 2015.

⁹⁰ UN General Assembly, *Measures to eliminate international terrorism (A/RES/70/120)*, 2015.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² UN CTC, *About the Counter-Terrorism Committee*, 2016.

⁹³ UN CTC, *Our Mandate*, 2016.

⁹⁴ UN CTC, *Special Meetings*, 2016.

meetings, the CTC and CTED have addressed kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom to fund terrorist organizations, technical assistance for Member States, capacity-building for Member States, and terrorists' use of new technologies.⁹⁵ In the May 2016 SC Presidential Statement, the President also requested the CTC and CTED provide a comprehensive international framework that would list best practices to effectively counter terrorist organizations.⁹⁶ Mainly, the framework would provide measures to prevent groups like ISIL, Al-Qaida, and other terrorist entities means of recruiting people to commit acts of terror.⁹⁷ The proposal framework is due to the SC by 30 April 2017.⁹⁸

Like the SC, the GA endorsed the creation of a sub-committee, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), to address issues of counter-terrorism.⁹⁹ CTITF was created by the UN Secretary-General (SG) in 2005.¹⁰⁰ The task force is composed of 38 international entities that have a stake in counter-terrorism efforts, either by mandate or scope of work.¹⁰¹ These entities include organizations like the IAEA, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and UN Development Programme.¹⁰² The main objective of the CTITF is to achieve the successful implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.¹⁰³ In order to aid the task force and entities party to the CTITF, the task force created and launched the Compendium.¹⁰⁴ The Compendium is an online resource that is maintained by CTITF and links its users to over 300 resources, all pertaining to counter-terrorism and protecting national borders.¹⁰⁵

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In 2006, the GA unanimously adopted the *Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*.¹⁰⁶ The Strategy is comprised of four pillars that address various means of combating terrorism, including: addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building states' capacity and strengthening the role of the UN; and ensuring human rights and the rule of law.¹⁰⁷ The strategy is reviewed every two years, with the most recent review being July 2016. In the review, the GA stated that the strategy needs to be implemented by all Member States, and that the successful implementation for UN and specialized agencies would take an enhancement to their in order to be more effective in the implementation of the Strategy.¹⁰⁸

In order to achieve the first pillar, organizations aligning with the strategy can utilize the newly established program by the SG called Alliance of the Civilizations.¹⁰⁹ The Alliance of the Civilizations will assist in establishing programs to address tolerance of different groups of people under the auspices of the UN.¹¹⁰ The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization will also aid in the first pillar by providing inter- and intra- faith-based programming to educate and spread public awareness in respect to national laws, religious practices, and ethnic issues in order to promote a culture of peace among groups.¹¹¹ As reported by the SG, some states have had success with implementing the first pillar.¹¹² In April 2015, the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to

⁹⁵ UN CTC, *Special Meetings*, 2016.

⁹⁶ UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2016/6)*.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² UN CTITF, *Entities*, 2016.

¹⁰³ UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*, 2016.

¹⁰⁴ UN CTITF, *Publications*, 2016.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹⁰⁷ UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.

¹⁰⁸ UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016; UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review (A/RES/68/276)*, 2014.

¹⁰⁹ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

Protect brought religious leaders together from around the world to discuss the violent crimes with the help and support of the King Abdullah Centre for Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue.¹¹³ Also, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute started work on a pilot program for at risk juveniles or those who have had first-time involvement with foreign terrorist fighting activities.¹¹⁴

The second pillar can be achieved through the implementation of international law and respect to international protocols established through the conventions related to terrorism.¹¹⁵ In order to assist with the implementation of those various international conventions, the UN Office on Drug and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) were identified as the organizations to be utilized as a means to strengthen or create counter-terrorism mechanisms and centers in regional and sub-regional areas for due to their technical assistance and expertise.¹¹⁶ Additionally, the GA encourages strengthening travel bans and the means of responding to attacks from terrorist groups such as nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.¹¹⁷ Recently the UN has increased its efforts in border management and helping Member States with border control.¹¹⁸

In order to achieve the third pillar pertaining to capacity-building, the Strategy enlists the aid of the IMF, IAEA, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other like-minded organizations.¹¹⁹ In regards to the IMF, the Strategy encourages Member States to increase their capacity in identifying money-laundering for terrorist activities.¹²⁰ Other organizations such as the World Bank and INTERPOL are encouraged by the GA to assist with money-laundering protocols.¹²¹ In order to hinder terrorists' accessibility of nuclear weapons, pillar three instructs participating Member States to seek the technical assistance of the IAEA to help secure, teach, and identify weaknesses that make it easier for terrorist organizations to obtain nuclear weapons.¹²² Pillar three also encourages Member States to increase their ability to respond to a biological weapons attack through the technical expertise of the WHO.¹²³ Member States visited by the CTED continue to struggle with the implementation of a justice framework that has the capacity to deal with complex terrorist cases.¹²⁴ However, CTITF has developed a method from various UN entities working within a country to provide holistic and unified support through an initiative called the Integrated Assistance in Countering Terrorism (I-ACT).¹²⁵

Lastly, the fourth pillar of the strategy ensures that the GA resolution on *Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism* of December 2005 provides the fundamental framework that should be utilized.¹²⁶ This means that the efforts of Member States to establish protocols, laws, and regulations to combat terrorism cannot conflict with international law, specifically human rights laws.¹²⁷ In a CTITF working group lead by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, progress has been made in the creation of human rights-compliant counter-terrorism measures.¹²⁸ Likewise, there has been an emphasis put on

¹¹³ UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

¹¹⁹ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

the needs of victims of terrorist acts.¹²⁹ The UN Victims of Terrorism Support portal is an online tool for people harmed by terrorism.¹³⁰ Since January 2016, there have been over 121,000 users.¹³¹ Additionally, CTITF recently held a conference in February 2016 to understand victims' needs in terrorist attacks.¹³²

The April 2016 report from the SG announced that the implementation of the strategy is well underway.¹³³ Though the CTC, CTED, and GA do not publish the statistical data from the reviews, Member States worldwide have implemented the strategy.¹³⁴ The SG reports that Member States like Albania, Argentina, Australia, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Zambia, and about 30 others have reported that they have implemented one or more pillars of the strategy within their borders.¹³⁵ In addition the individual Member States, two regional bodies, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (AESEAN) and the European Union (EU), have submitted information showing their support for the implementation in their respective regions.¹³⁶

Conclusion

There have been thousands of people in the world who have been victims of terrorism.¹³⁷ Though UN efforts to combat terrorism have been consistent since the 1990s, terrorist organizations have still managed to thrive over the years.¹³⁸ In order to answer issues of terrorism, the SC and GA have both created specialized organizations such as the CTC, CTED, and CTITF to coordinate the efforts of the UN and combat terrorism.¹³⁹ However, the UN failed to unify efforts until the creation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.¹⁴⁰ The Strategy has provided a detailed plan of action for both the UN and Member States to follow in order to effectively hinder terrorist acts through the implementation of its four pillars.¹⁴¹ According to a recent report by the SG, the strategy has been implemented in some regions; however, statistical information has not been published.¹⁴² Over 30 Member States have successfully implemented or have begun the implementation of the strategy within their borders.¹⁴³ In addition, both AESEAN and the EU are also reporting the support for the implementation of the strategy in their regions.¹⁴⁴

Further Research

There are many questions that need to be addressed when addressing counter-terrorism measures, specifically pertaining implementation of the frameworks, resolutions, and strategies adopted by UN bodies. How can the SC help more Member States comply with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy? Is it possible to consolidate current frameworks into one universally accepted framework for terrorism? How can the SC strengthen the efforts of UN committees when assisting Member States? What are the next steps in the implementation of the Strategy?

¹²⁹ UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*, 2016.

¹⁴⁰ UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² UN General Assembly, *Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/826)*, 2016.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

II. Climate Change and the Maintenance of International Security

*We must make no mistake. The facts are clear: climate change is real; it is accelerating in a dangerous manner; and it not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security.*²⁶

History and Definition

Global

The discussion of climate change in the United Nations Organization has its origins on the scientific realization, during the second half of the 20th century, that emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from human action were accumulating in the atmosphere and contributing to global warming.²⁷ While the existence and effects of global warming have been debated for decades, the international community has accepted that man-made increases in the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere “result on average in an additional warming to the earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.”²⁸

The UN’s first step in addressing this threat was the 1992 “Earth Summit” which produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a binding document containing the responsibilities of each State in views to limiting global temperature increases and climate change.²⁹ The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was subsequently adopted in 1997, binding developed countries that ratified it to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels within a set timeframe.³⁰ Follow up and continual assessment of the global action on climate change is centered on the yearly UNFCCC Conferences of State Parties (COP), the most recent of which was held in Durban in 2011; the 2012 edition will take place in Doha, Qatar in December 2012. The ultimate objective of the international negotiations on climate is “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level what will limit dangerous human interference with the climate system.”³¹

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the World Meteorological Organization and The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) is a scientific body that “reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change.”³² Since its creation, it has produced five assessment reports meant to provide policymakers with “rigorous and balanced scientific information.”³³

Security Council

The issue of the potential negative effects on the maintenance of international security of man-made changes to the environment had been briefly brought up in the Security Council by different delegations during debates on topics as diverse as HIV/AIDS and international security, the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa, the African food crisis, small arms, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, Haiti, and new threats to international peace and security. April of 2007, however, saw the first time the Council discussed the potential impact of climate change on security during a debate initiated by the United Kingdom on the relationship between energy, security and climate.³⁴ Many Member States, among them the Non-Aligned Movement and G77+China, sent letters to the Council expressing their concern over what they considered its encroachment on General Assembly (GA) and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) mandates.³⁵ While this particular session had no formal outcome, global concern about the implications of climate change has intensified since 2007.³⁶ In 2009, the General Assembly held a debate on the security implications of climate change, and adopted resolution 63/281, which made reference to the aforementioned Council debate on energy, security, and climate and invited the relevant UN organs “as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate

²⁶ Ban Ki Moon. United Nations Security Council, *6587th meeting (S/PV.6587)*, 2011.

²⁷ United Nations, *Climate Change*.

²⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992*.

²⁹ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change*.

³⁰ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change*.

³¹ United Nations, *Climate Change: The Negotiations*.

³² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *History*.

³³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *History*.

³⁴ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

³⁵ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

³⁶ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

change, including its possible security implications.”³⁷ Likewise, it requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to report on the “possible security implications of climate change.”³⁸

In his report, the Secretary General expressed that climate change is a “threat multiplier, exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, weak institutions for resource management and conflict resolutions, fault lines and a history of mistrust between communities and nations, and inadequate access to information or resources.”³⁹

The first ever Presidential Statement on climate change, was produced during a debate on the topic of “maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change” in 2011.⁴⁰ It stressed the responsibility of the GA and the ECOSOC for sustainable development issues, reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the key instrument for addressing climate change, and expressed concern “that the possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security,” and that “possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.”⁴¹

Definition

The UNFCCC defines climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”⁴² Likewise, it defines adverse effects of climate change as “changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change, which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.”⁴³

The Relationship Between Climate Change and International Security

The 2009 Report of the Secretary General entitled *Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications (A/64/350)* provides a comprehensive outline of the relationship between climate change and international security based on the views of Member States and relevant regional and international organizations.⁴⁴ Namely, “what form [these threats] could take, and what combinations of actions could avert them.”⁴⁵

When talking about the links between climate change and international security, the report of the Secretary General emphasizes that security implications can be more pronounced in setting with low levels human development and low institutions, where social and political tensions and armed conflict are more likely to surface.⁴⁶ In this sense, the reports notes that climate change is a threat multiplier that exacerbates already existing sources of conflict and insecurity.⁴⁷ Climate change can impact security through five channels: “increasing human vulnerability; retarding economic and social development; triggering responses that may increase risks of conflict, such as migration and resource competition; causing statelessness; and straining mechanisms of international cooperation.”⁴⁸

Threats to Human Well-being and Increase of Human Vulnerability

While climate change has the potential to threaten human well-being directly, it also exacerbates human vulnerability. In this context, human vulnerability is understood as “the processes by which individuals, societies and

³⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications (A/RES/63/281)*, 2009, P. 1.

³⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications (A/RES/63/281)*, 2009, P. 2.

³⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*, 2011, p. 2.

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*, 2011, p. 2.

⁴² United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Art. 1.*

⁴³ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Art. 1.*

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 12.

⁴⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 13.

⁴⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 21.

ecosystems are susceptible to harm as a result of climate change.”⁴⁹ United Nations documents have established a link between vulnerability of populations and international security. The 2003 UN Report on the World Social Situation, for example, refers to vulnerability as a factor capable of “fuelling social tensions and undermining the social cohesion needed to pre-empt and respond to emerging dangers.”⁵⁰ According to the report, civil strife and the proliferation of conflicts are manifestations of vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity.⁵¹

The main ways in which climate change can increase the vulnerability of populations are through impacts on food production and food security, health and the incidence of disease, the frequency and intensity of weather events, and sea level rise.⁵² People that are dependent on natural capital that is sensitive to climate change are the ones most at risk.⁵³ The mentioned impacts can increase poverty and lead to the reversal of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.⁵⁴ Finally, “as many least developed countries are both highly exposed and highly vulnerable to climate change, and as the poor within countries are usually the most vulnerable, climate change is likely to exacerbate inequalities both between and within countries.”⁵⁵

According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, due to climate change, food productivity in low latitudes may decrease up to 50% by 2020, causing food crises at a much larger scale than what has previously been seen.⁵⁶ This is a matter of concern since during the last few years, the rise in food prices and its resulting effect on food security, especially in Africa, caused social protests and unrest in many cities around the world.⁵⁷ Climate change can also cause longer and more intense droughts and the accompanying water shortages, especially in drylands and in small-island developing States, potentially affecting the human habitability of these regions.⁵⁸ The lack of access to safe drinking water has a negative effect on nutrition and the prevention of disease. Likewise, climate change could affect health through “death, injury and disease from extreme weather events; heat stress and cardiovascular illness from elevated ground-level ozone in urban areas; and the number of people at risk of dengue fever.”⁵⁹ While there are some positive effects on health such as the reduction in deaths from cold exposure, the negative effects outweigh them, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East.⁶⁰ Furthermore, extreme weather events are associated with costly damages in the infrastructure and productive assets of coastal cities. Finally, sea level rise in small-island developing states is expected to “exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, threatening vital infrastructure, settlements, and facilities that support the livelihoods of island communities.”⁶¹

Economic Growth and Development

As discussed before, climate change is capable of causing economic disruptions, which can negatively impact growth, “eroding the revenue base of Governments and undermining governance capacities.”⁶² A few ways in which this can happen are the following: crop losses from drought and flooding; reduced productivity of humans and

⁴⁹ Adger, *Climate Change, Human Well-Being and Insecurity*, 2010, p. 290.

⁵⁰ United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation 2003 (A/58/153/Rev. 1)*, 2003, p. 1.

⁵¹ United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation 2003 (A/58/153/Rev. 1)*, 2003, p. 1.

⁵² United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵³ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 30.

⁵⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 32.

⁵⁷ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, p. 4.

⁵⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 35.

⁵⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 37.

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 38.

⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 44.

⁶² United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 45.

animals due to the adverse effects on health; land degradation and damage to infrastructure in coastal areas, among others. The effects are most pervasive in economies dependent on primary sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, and forests, those that depend on tourism, and small-island States.⁶³

The report of the Secretary General notes that a significant slowdown in economic growth could pose “a serious security threat to developing countries, not least by worsening poverty and desperation. Growth is seen as important to strengthening resilience, maintaining political stability, increasing the attractiveness of cooperation and providing hope to undermined populations.”⁶⁴

Threats from Uncoordinated Coping

Much of the discussion surrounding the security implications of climate change has to do with the consequences of the aforementioned effects on human well-being and economic developments if they happen at a large-scale or very rapidly. In this sense “climate change is likely to overwhelm local capacities to adapt to changing environmental conditions and reinforce the trend towards general instability that already exists in many societies and regions, particularly in weak and fragile states with poorly performing institutions and systems of government.”⁶⁵ Societies that unable to cope will apply strategies of survival that might conflict with those of other communities and societies.⁶⁶ Uncoordinated coping and survival strategies might include large-scale migration and competition for resources, both of which could increase the risks of conflict.⁶⁷ There is the concern that climate change will reverse the progress made in the reduction of armed conflict in Africa. According to the 2007 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) Sudan Post-conflict Environmental Assessment, “climate change, land degradation and the resulting competition over scarce natural resources are among the root causes as well as the consequences of the violence and grave humanitarian situation in the [Darfur] region.”⁶⁸

The situation related to the availability of water resources in Sub-Saharan Africa can best exemplify how sudden resource scarcity could lead to violent conflict. Because of their nature, water sources are usually shared at the local, national and international levels. This means that sometimes many different groups of people with different needs, not only communities but also corporations and public institutions, draw water from the same sources. Tensions can arise even without water scarcity because of the many factors that must be considered, which depend on the nature of the need of each actor. For example, a better quality of the resource is needed for some uses, such as human consumption, while others depend on the concentration of great quantities of water, such as dams. In this regard, the effects of water scarcity may exacerbate those existing tensions or create new ones, “limited water availability and lacking adaptation reinforce existing marginalization of population groups,” and where political instability is already present “lacking access to water may be an additional destabilizing factor.”⁶⁹

Climate change can trigger environmental migration by exacerbating current environmental problems that affect people’s livelihoods such as food and water scarcity, land degradation, sea-level rise, and increased intensity of weather events. According to the International Organization for Migration, estimates of how many people could migrate –both nationally and internationally- by 2050 because of climate change vary between 200 million and 1 billion.⁷⁰ Migration is already a cause of concern in many receiving and transit countries, especially in the developing world. Several countries in Africa, a continent that hosts 30% of the world’s refugees, have already experienced social unrest and problems related to xenophobia and human trafficking.⁷¹ In this sense, “large-scale

⁶³United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 45.

⁶⁴United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 15.

⁶⁵ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, P. 4.

⁶⁶United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁶⁷United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁶⁸ United Nations Environment Program, *Sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment*, 2007, P. 20.

⁶⁹ Carius, Houdret and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

⁷⁰ International Migration Organization, *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*, 2010, P. 1.

⁷¹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, p. 18.

population displacement will redraw the ethnic map of many countries, bringing previously separate groups into close proximity with each other and in competition for the same resources.⁷² In fact, according to the 2009 Report of the Secretary General, 32 out of 103 ethnic conflicts between 1945 and 2005 resulted from conflicts between indigenous peoples and migrants from other parts of the country.⁷³

Another problem that surfaces with the transnational movement of large amounts of people due to environmental reasons is that there is currently not an international legal framework to deal with these environmental migrants. The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees only protects people that have crossed a national border due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” and are unable or unwilling to come back their country of habitual residence.⁷⁴ This means that the States that have ratified that convention do not have an obligation of protecting environmental migrants, but rather, are free to consider them mere economic migrants since they do not fit into the definition of a refugee. The development of a parallel legal framework of protection is complicated because “as displacement often results from a combination of factors, it is particularly challenging to define a category of protected person based on the cause of migration.”⁷⁵

Possible Security Council Action

An issue of great controversy in the international community is to what extent the mandate of the Security Council could allow it to discuss and take action on environmental issues and specifically on climate change. As mentioned before, until now, the Security Council has only adopted a Presidential Statement on climate change and the maintenance of international peace and security. Some countries, especially in the developing world, reject the notion that the topic should even be discussed in the Council. History, however, has shown that the Council is flexible enough to discuss evolving security concerns and generally accepted science has proven the existence and pervasive effects of climate change.⁷⁶ How, then, could the Security Council, in keeping with its mandate, act upon the threat of climate change before the actual outbreak of conflict?

The UN Charter does not dictate which topics the Security Council can or cannot discuss; the only criteria is that they should be limited to situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, or that the Council has identified them as a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.⁷⁷ In this sense, the Council can itself identify what constitutes a threat to the peace.⁷⁸ Therefore, “it would not need to wait until climate change had prompted war in order to act. The Security Council can authorize a response to an actual or threatened internal conflict or humanitarian crisis and could do so if the threat to a specific country were of a direct nature.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Council could use its binding power under the Charter to respond to cases of imminent danger arising from climate change, this would not mean that the Council could authorize the use of force but rather, for example, “require that some or all states take action to assist a State... mitigate the impacts of climate change and adapt to altered geographical realities.”⁸⁰

A different approach can be based on the dangers of climate change not as a specific threat but as a threat of a general nature, much in the way the Security Council has acted regarding international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this sense, the Council could establish an *ad hoc* committee as it did under resolutions 1773 and 1540 to deal with the environment and development.⁸¹ This approach seems, however, unlikely since there are already many forums worldwide which discuss different aspects related to climate change and the environment in general, and the Security Council would not want duplicate those efforts.⁸² Perhaps the most realistic way in which the Council could incorporate the climate change into its actions would be in the contexts of Chapter VI of the

⁷² Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2009*, p. 19.

⁷³ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁷⁴ United Nations, *Convention on the status of refugees, 1951*, Art. 1.

⁷⁵ Hausler and McCorquodale, *Climate Change and its impact on security and survival*. 2011, p. 620.

⁷⁶ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992*.

⁷⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations, 1945*, Arts 39, 40.

⁷⁸ Scott, *Securitizing climate change: international legal implications and obstacles*, 2008, p. 608.

⁷⁹ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 61.

⁸⁰ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

⁸¹ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

⁸² Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

Charter and in its peacekeeping and peace building operations. On one hand the Council could be more active in identifying and addressing situations where an escalation of conflict is possible due to the negative effects of climate change and use the mechanisms devised in Chapter VI. On the other hand, it could incorporate into the mandates of the different peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission considerations in “fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development.”⁸³

Case Study: the Marshall Islands

A rise in the level of the seas is one of the most certain and dramatic impacts of climate change.⁸⁴ It is small-island developing states (SIDS), most of them “remote, small in land area and population (less than 1.5 million), with a very narrow resource base and fragile land and marine ecosystems,” which are the most vulnerable to this phenomenon.⁸⁵ Currently, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs lists 51 SIDS in three regions: the AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea), the Caribbean, and the Pacific.⁸⁶ Hundreds of people live in the archipelagoes and coral atolls of the Pacific, and about two million in the Caribbean Islands.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands, located in the North Pacific Ocean region, is a collection five single islands and 29 remote coral atolls, each made up of small islets, which together amount to approximately 1,000. The country’s average altitude is just 2 meters above sea level, which makes IPCC projections of sea-level rise of between 0.19 and 0.58m especially worrying.⁸⁷ Climate change, therefore, is a threat to the habitability and physical presence of much of the territory of the Marshall Islands, especially “entails a threat to both the future habitability and physical presence of the Marshall Islands’ thin and low-lying islands.”⁸⁸

The security impacts of sea-level rise for the Marshall Islands, accompanied by ““multiplier” issues such as the ability to preserve social order, or intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources... also serve as a threat to national survival.”⁸⁹ In fact, “the potential “vanishing” of a sovereign nation, without a successor state, is not only a security implication but may rise to the level of a threat to international peace and security.”⁹⁰ For the government of the Marshall Islands, facing the possibility of disappearance due to man-made climate change is no different from facing a large-scale military invasion.⁹¹ In this context, the distinction between security and development that is sometimes unclear in other climate impacts is very clear for the Marshall Islands because it poses a severe threat to physical existence; “there can be no national sustainable development without an associated nation.”⁹²

A 2009 report presented to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by the Permanent Representative of the Marshall Islands to the UN on views regarding the possible security implications of climate change outlines two major security implications of sea-level rise for that country. First, climate change threatens resources completely, even to the point in which it undermines essential social foundations, in addition to serving as a multiplier for tension and competition for resources, ultimately causing conflict.⁹³ The effects on food and water security would be devastating. For example, since the Marshall Islands rely on a thin freshwater lens, any shift in salinization and weather patterns

⁸³ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 61.

⁸⁴ Leatherman and Beller-Simms, *Sea-level rise and small island states: an overview*, 1997, p. 1.

⁸⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Small Island Developing States*.

⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Small Island Developing States*.

⁸⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability*, 2007, p. 694.

⁸⁸ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 7.

⁹⁰ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 7.

⁹¹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 9.

⁹² Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 11.

⁹³ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 12.

could pose a threat to the ability to supply water.⁹⁴ Also, lacking access to food and water, the islands may become uninhabitable even before they become inundated.⁹⁵

Finally, climate change threatens statehood sovereignty and territorial integrity because it threatens the very existence of the state. This poses challenges related to the respect for self-determination since the independence of a Government that has lost its territory may come into question “even in a potential scenario wherein the legal “existence” of affected States were permitted to continue by the international community, governments of affected States would face many constraints in practice and their populations would be likely to find themselves largely in a situation that would be similar to, if not the same as, if statehood had ceased.”⁹⁶ The resulting statelessness could mean that the population of the country, since they would not qualify as refugees, would become dependent on the rights a host state is willing to grant them. Problems likely to surface are “restrictions on their freedom of movement, including detention; the inability to seek employment; and lack of access to property or even basic health care.”⁹⁷

Conclusion

The topic of climate change and the maintenance of international security is a complex one. While the Security Council seems more open than ever to discuss non-traditional security topics, and the issue of climate change has already been brought up in its midst, the discussion as to what exactly should be its role is still prevalent in international circles. A main question that surfaces is whether the Security Council should take a more active role in addressing the issue, and if so, should it take a case-by-case approach or a more general one? Also, since climate change affects many different aspects of people’s lives, how can the Security Council effectively coordinate its actions with the existing international framework for climate change and sustainable development in a way that will not overstep the mandates of other UN bodies?

Annotated Bibliography

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This is a very thorough and comprehensive study on the implications of climate change in African security. Its contents include: scientific data related to climate change; information on Africa's particular vulnerabilities, information on water and food scarcity, the possible causes and consequences of climate induced migration, the impact of climate change on poverty, and the prospects for the future.

United Nations General Assembly (11 September, 2009). *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*. Retrieved July 21st, 2012 from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s%20report%202009.pdf>

In 2009, The Security Council asked the Secretary General for this report on the security implications of climate change. This is, therefore, the essential document for this topic as it outlines the views of different member states regarding the topic. It is the logical starting point for any research on climate change and the Security Council. In his report, the Secretary General

⁹⁴ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 12.

⁹⁵ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 12.

⁹⁶ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 14.

⁹⁷ Park, *Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States, 2011*, P. 15.

focuses on five channels through which climate change could affect security: vulnerability, development, coping and security, statelessness and international conflict.

Park, S. (May 2011). *Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States*. Retrieved August 25 from: <http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf>

This document, prepared for the UNHCR, is a comprehensive assessment of statehood and the problem of statelessness in low-lying Island States. The report contains basic information about the concepts of statehood and statelessness, as well as an overview of the implications of statelessness caused by climate change, especially from the viewpoint of international human rights and refugee laws. Furthermore, it outlines possible strategies to prevent statelessness and early actions to be taken.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Retrieved August 24, 2012 from: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm

This document was prepared by the IPCC, which has the task of providing authoritative international statements of the scientific understanding of climate change. The IPCC creates periodic assessments of causes, impacts and possible responses to climate change. This particular report is organized by regions and by themes. Of special interest for research on this topic are the chapters dealing with the different regions, and also chapter 18, which deals specifically with the inter-relationships between adaptation and migration.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations (July 2009). *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/Marshall_Islands_CCIS.pdf

This document was presented by the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands as part of the preparation of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's report on the possible security implications of climate change. It is an extremely interesting study tool to understand the position of those states that see their very survival affected by climate change and specifically sea-level rise. The Government of the Marshall Islands sets forth its view on international security, the threat posed to its country by climate change, and the possible actions that can be taken by the international community to prevent it.

International Migration Organization (2009). *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*. Retrieved July 21, 2012 from: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf

This report, prepared by the International Migration Organization, gives a comprehensive assessment of migration as related to climate change. It reviews the available scientific knowledge on the topic, notes the challenges to measuring a migration-environment nexus, show data on that nexus, addresses the problem of migration in different kinds of natural disasters, including drought and desertification and how to manage them, and finally makes an overview of the existing legal and normative framework for the protection of environmentally displaced people.

United Nations Security Council (20 July, 2011). *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*. Retrieved July 22nd, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PRST/2011/15>.

This Presidential Statement made by the Security Council in 2011 is one of the most important documents to take into account when researching for this topic because it is the only official

document of the Security Council that deals exclusively with the issue of climate change and international security. Delegates should carefully analyze each of the thoroughly negotiated paragraphs, being especially mindful of the language the Council uses.