

History of the United Nations Security Council

Created after World War II as an attempt to remedy the failures of the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has existed for the entirety of the UN and is now one of the six major bodies of the organization. As Article 1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) states, the first purpose of the UN is "[to] maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats..." It is the primary job of the SC to take substantive action on such issues of peace and security. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the SC has the full power to investigate any situation that might result in conflict and threaten international peace and security, and take subsequent action.

The UN Charter establishes the main functions of the SC as the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among states, cooperation to solve international disputes, and the promotion of human rights. While the SC operates as a single body, under Article 25 of the UN Charter it has the ability to establish subsidiary committees such as the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict, the Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees, the Sanctions Committees, Peacekeeping Operations, International Tribunals, and various Standing and Ad Hoc committees, which all operate to support the overarching mandate of the SC and are comprised of the current SC member state representation. Through coordination of these bodies, the SC is able to call for ceasefires, request discussions to resolve issues leading to conflict, and launch investigations into disputes or situations that may disrupt international peace.

The SC is made up of five permanent Member States (the P5): France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America; additionally, there are 10 non-permanent rotating Member States that are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The leaders of the victorious Allied countries following World War II hold the P5 seats. The P5 also hold veto power, which means they can prevent any substantive draft resolution from being adopted by the SC with a negative vote. The remaining 10 non-permanent Member States are chosen to represent the diverse geographical regions of the world, and do not hold veto power. Of these 15 Member States, each is granted the Presidency of the SC for a single month, serving on a rotating alphabetical basis. For any procedural change or resolution to pass in the SC, it must garner a total of at least nine votes. It is also important to recognize that under Article 25 of the UN Charter, the SC is the only committee in the UN that may issue legally binding decisions.

In 2014 alone, the SC has adopted resolutions on conflicts in Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, Sudan/South Sudan, Iran, Mali, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Kosovo, the Middle East, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. Aside from focusing on these immediate crises, the SC is also currently studying the long-term goal of global peace by publishing policy reports and resolutions on the thematic debates around terrorism, gender issues in combat, conflict in former colonial states, and general matters of peace and security. This represents a growing evolution of the body to shift focus away from only situational matters, and to also examine and discuss broader and more impactful thematic issues. These thematic approaches are rooted in resolutions proposing preventative measures, increased intelligence, comprehensive reactionary approaches, and usage of cross-body collaboration within the international community.

As one of the most prominent bodies of the UN, the SC is under constant scrutiny from the international community. One of the main criticisms has been the veto power of the P5 because it gives these Member States undue power to veto any resolutions that may conflict with their own interests and foreign policy, misrepresenting the views and needs of the majority. For instance, the recent vetoes from both China and Russia on the SC's resolution to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposing the referral, as well as the U.S.'s legacy of vetoing resolutions addressing the Palestinian question, have been particularly condemned by critics. Similarly, the membership of the P5 has been further critiqued for inaccurately assessing and assisting with the needs of Member States in the global south, as well as under representing Member States in the global south within SC membership itself. The SC's funding has also been a matter of debate, as it is funded independently from the UN budget and therefore may be at higher risk than other central UN bodies for financial bias influencing policies. As a result, the success of certain SC operations has been undermined by criticism of potential bias, and in this criticism, the SC loses some of the credibility it requires to operate and implement policy amongst Member States.

Though the SC is not a perfect institution, it remains indisputably relevant as a powerful force in the international community. With over 15 years of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone having been concluded in March 2014 after regaining peace following the civil wars of the early 1990s, quick responses to poaching threats in central Africa,

and its position as the international leader of the ICC's International Criminal Tribunals, the SC continues to make positive substantive impacts on the international community. Furthermore, its increased focus on thematic issues, as well as the movement towards its increased transparency, has ensured that the SC continues to involve itself in the most current state of global affairs. Amidst intense global pressures, cooperation and diplomacy are still of the utmost importance in the SC's dealings and are reflected throughout its work of protecting the world's population in the pursuit of international peace and security.

I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States

- What steps can the SC take to improve its responsiveness to crises in failed or fragile nascent states?
- What resources are required on the part of the international community and the UN to prevent crises from stalling and becoming full-scale conflicts?
- How can and should the SC adapt to ever-changing circumstances and the uncertainties that failed and fragile nascent states present?

While there is no internationally agreed-upon definition for a failed state, the overall consensus is that such states are often characterized by their inability to impose order or wield legitimate force due to a collapse of government, often resulting in a loss of territory and the creation of an unstable environment. A recent example of a failed state is Somalia prior to 2012. A fragile or fragile nascent state, while not as dysfunctional as a failed state, is nevertheless extremely susceptible to instability and is in constant danger of losing the ability to carry out basic political, security, and economic functions. Internal or regional conflicts, severe poverty, and generally weak institutions usually mire both. Fragile nascent states in particular are usually confronted with these obstacles due to severe political transition into a "new" government. Two current examples of fragile nascent states are South Sudan and Libya. When a state fails or becomes fragile, crises are not confined within its borders. In fact, unlike in situations of political unrest, the borders themselves may begin to grow blurry, as widespread fighting holds the possibility of transforming into a regional conflict, thereby threatening international peace, security, and stability. When such a situation arises, the United Nations (UN) must manage the crisis as swiftly as possible, using all tools at its disposal.

The situations many of these types of states and their citizens face are dire. Political infighting can result in an outbreak of militant violence or, in more dramatic cases, a coup d'état. Conflict is bred by these political differences in addition to extreme religious intolerance, which forces tens of thousands of citizens to flee their homes, frequently leading to mass migrations into refugee camps in neighboring states. As conflict continues to spread and intensify, these camps become increasingly overcrowded and are even targeted by armed groups involved in the conflicts. Governments are in severe disarray, meaning they cannot effectively protect their citizens from harm, nor can they provide them with basic living needs. The rule of law is often left under- or unenforced, and the crisis continues to worsen. In some cases, such as the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), transitional governments are set up to try and exercise as much influence and control as possible on its citizens and territory. If such a regime is not installed quickly enough, a chaotic environment is likely to ensue as armed groups and terrorist organizations vie and compete for power, territory, and resources.

Prevention and response are two ways in which the UN can manage crises in failed and fragile states. Development through rebuilding infrastructure and institutions offers a way to prevent against future violence, but it is much harder for administrations to make meaningful progress in this area while in the midst of intense armed conflict, especially with an extremely limited set of resources. Engagement with civil society is also an important component of this process, and often can be the difference between failure and success in crisis management. Crisis management takes many forms at the UN, but the responsibility of responding to crises is mainly tasked to the Security Council (SC), as laid out in Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945). Through a variety of different departments, agencies, and organizations, the SC coordinates and manages all urgent matters that would threaten international peace and security. Though there are a great many actors when it comes to crisis management in the UN, the SC is the biggest decision-maker, and as a result must weigh many different options at any given time. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are utilized for peacekeeping and field operations, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) serve as advisory bodies, and various regional offices and organizations are relied upon for their knowledge, expertise, and coordination. In an era when the UN is attempting to be more holistic and coherent as an organization, the job of the SC is made that much more difficult as it strives to incorporate all the necessary components into PKOs for the best possible chance of success. This new age of robust, multidimensional peacekeeping is a direct result of trial and error over the last two decades, and lessons learned are emerging at a rapid pace. The SC, struggling to keep up with this pace, must apply such lessons to their management of crises, military or otherwise. One lesson learned and applied in this way was the realization of the significance of dedicated

peacebuilding efforts, which led to the creation of the PBC in 2005. This was part of a major organizational restructuring of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and their administration with the idea that more comprehensive and broad approaches were needed.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding, two of the most significant aspects of crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states, at the UN are constantly being adapted to meet the needs of specific situations. Peacekeeping is one of the first, and most robust, tools employed by the SC as a form of crisis management in failed and fragile states, since it places a neutral force in the midst of conflict with the goal of defusing volatile situations before they intensify further. This is imperative to execute well for a diplomatic peace process to even begin. However, certain reforms are not only relevant but also outright necessary across all PKOs and peacebuilding operations if strides are to be made in facilitating more robust, multidimensional crisis management in these states. Three prominent reforms include engagement with civil society, inter-agency cooperation, and responsiveness. In failed or fragile states, in particular, reforms are even more necessary because terrorist and other organizations often seek to take advantage of the vacuum caused by the lack of a strong government or military presence that would otherwise halt conflict. Rapid and swift responsiveness is therefore the key in such situations, but lack of resources exacerbates and prolongs the problem, often dragging in additional regional and international actors that are forced to handle and confront the issue. The addition of more actors complicates matters further due to each respective interests, internal politics, and limitations, increasing the factors, which need to be considered by all parties involved before making any decisions on how to solve the crisis. All of these reforms and more are a product of reflections on the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s (Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia).

Along with engaging with civil society, civilian training and empowerment, delivered with a gender balance appropriate to the situation, engages local populations in not only assisting in rebuilding their governmental institutions, but also bringing about development to combat the underlying issue of poverty. In his 2013 report to the SC on women, and peace and security, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined several steps needed to achieve gender balanced reform, including the increased assignment of gender experts to all field operations and offices of his special representatives, as well as increasing the proportion of women in the uniformed components of peacekeeping and national security sector institutions. The expectation of such reforms is that a more balanced gender perspective mainstreamed throughout UN coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts will ensure that all citizens involved are represented and everyone's issues are addressed, so that peace is wholly and comprehensively sustainable.

Inter-agency cooperation is especially vital to crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states. Due to its similarity in mission and scope of operations in Africa, one of the UN's natural partners in maintaining international peace and security in that region is the European Union (EU). In 2003, the UN and the European Union signed the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management*, to mutually enhance each organization's planning, training, communication, and best practices in the areas of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and rapid deployment. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, however, overall EU operational contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have been lacking, with the exceptions of a rapid deployment force (EUFOR DRC) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006 and an ongoing mission (EUFOR République centrafricaine) in CAR since 2007. One major reason for this is the residual distrust of the effectiveness of UN PKOs after the failures of the 1990s. This partnership has not been as effective or constructive over the past decade; however, there are opportunities to explore in this partnership. One general suggestion has been to simply focus the nature of the cooperative relationship to create a more feasible and accomplishable agreement for crisis management. Another optimistic outlook is that the newly established European External Action Service will serve as a more concrete and reliable component in joint operations with the UN, perhaps inspiring the UN to create a similar organ modeled after it in the future. Since there is already a strong financial link in place between the two organizations (with the EU providing over 1/3 of the budget for UN PKOs in 2013), and considering the fact that UN PKOs have become much more comprehensive and robust in recent years, it is likely that UN-EU cooperation in crisis management will continue for the foreseeable future, perhaps even growing closer and more focused. This collaboration remains crucial in the endeavor of improving the responsiveness and efficacy of missions in fragile states.

Responsiveness is another key area for reform in crisis management. Rapid response forces, or troops that are capable of being deployed promptly in the event of an emergency, are a popular idea for how to reform the SC's responsiveness to situations that can change suddenly. These forces are favored over peacekeeping missions due to their ability to respond to crises within days rather than weeks or months. Speed is one of the most important factors in deploying these types of forces to failed or fragile states, as a crisis can become a conflict in a much shorter amount of time than would normally be expected in relatively stable Member States. One current example of a rapid response force, though not yet a fully operational one, is the African Union's (AU) African Standby Force (ASF). While the AU had hoped to achieve full operational capability by 2015, an assessment published by an AU

Independent Panel of Experts predicts that major changes would have to take place for this to occur. Challenges include the lack of a framework between the ASF and the regional economic communities in Africa (into which regional standby forces are assigned under the ASF), as well as the severe lack of logistics and regional depots throughout the continent. Such a rapid response force, however, could serve as a model for the SC if it attempts to create a similar organization. Also, with the additional resources of the UN and UN Member States, these forces could potentially garner greater success than the ASF. Through such an idea there is substantial room for UN-AU inter-agency cooperation as many of the PKOs overseen by the SC are deployed in Africa and could largely benefit from assistance and coordination with a fully operational ASF or other form of rapid response force.

This pattern of reform and transformation of PKOs in failed and fragile nascent states still continues and has drastically changed since the failures of the 1990s. The current discussion involving failed or fragile nascent states has very recent roots as a thematic issue in the Security Council. Most recently this topic was brought up as a major discussion point at the annual SC retreat from 21-22 April 2014, and focused primarily on the situations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and South Sudan. In April 2014, the SC established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will take the place of a current, AU-led PKO in September 2014. Mandated to protect civilians from harm while supporting the transitional government, MINUSCA is the latest in a string of multidimensional PKOs created by the SC to either replace or augment existing forces, or address a sudden crisis which requires a robust and multifaceted response. In the latter situations, these PKOs are created in lieu of a rapid response force, since there currently is not one in place. While these PKOs indeed have begun to improve the gender balance and involve civil society more than in the past, a reliable and feasible UN rapid response force is not yet a reality. The funding of troops and troop contribution to such a force are key issues when discussing its feasibility, and will continue to be relevant in future talks involving crisis management and multidimensional peacekeeping.

The current crisis in the CAR illustrates well the obstacles that the SC faces in managing crisis situations in failed and fragile nascent states. UN PKOs exist in several similar situations with varying resources, partnerships, funding, and mandates, the weakness or lack of which can mean the difference between progress and intractability of a crisis. The SC must continue to renew peacekeeping missions' mandates on their merits and accomplishments, and remain adaptable to the ever-changing situation on the ground. The SC's capacity for crisis management in failed or fragile nascent states is being tested with each new situation. New advances around precise strategies, particularly in relation to civilian engagement, gender balance, and rapid responsiveness will continue to develop in the next several years and must remain at the forefront of the SC's ongoing debate to address challenges more holistically. But as it stands today, the progress on this issue serves as a solid framework for the future of crisis management at the UN, keeping the particularly unique and difficult needs of both failed and fragile nascent states in mind.

II. Sexual Violence in Conflict

- How can the Security Council combat the existing lack of awareness of sexual violence in conflict through UN peacekeeping forces?
- How will current training regimes be modified to aid military personnel in helping survivors of sexual violence?
- Will recent crises in Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan shift Security Council policy regarding sexual violence in conflict?

The recognition of sexual violence in conflict by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) is a recent development. The rights of women and other marginalized groups have historically been seen by the international community as second to peace and security issues. In contrast, the major international bodies have traditionally prioritized military strategy and combat, with the SC having been the leader on the political psychology behind this policy focus. However, the nature of war has recently begun to shift: the crises in Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) demonstrated that combat, previously viewed as a clash between armies, has begun to revolve around targeting of the enemies' civilians. Noticeably, the form that this combat often takes has been rampant sexual violence, not merely as a product of war but as a deliberate military strategy. The damage this causes to citizens around the world is significant, widespread, and endangers the international peace and security the SC is tasked with preserving.

As a response, the UN recently began moving towards measures that recognize this shift in military strategy. The UN recently created the UNiTE to End Sexual Violence campaign, which unites the work of all major UN bodies to combat sexual violence in conflict. The UN has concluded that sexual violence represents the greatest cause of casualties among women and children in conflict. Additionally, on 11 April 2013, the Group of Eight (G8) adopted the *G8 Declaration on Human Rights on Conflict*, which states, "Sexual violence in armed conflict represents one of

the most serious forms of violation or abuse of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.” The G8 ministers further pledged through this meeting to aid in ending sexual violence on an international level.

One of the major motivators behind the UN’s movement to categorize sexual assault during conflict as a weapon of war has been the monumental sexual violence seen in civil crises of the early 1990s. In 1992, an ethnically and politically fragmented Bosnia began to splinter under Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia’s recently elected president, and his aims of ethnically cleansing Eastern Europe. It was to be the most devastating conflict in Europe since WWII, and would result in the first recognition of sexual violence in conflict as “mass rape” or “genocidal rape.” Targeting specifically Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, the sexual assaults occurred on an immense scale, often in what were deemed “rape camps,” not only as a method of violence, but as a means of ethnic repression. The human rights abuses of Bosnia motivated the International Criminal Court (ICC), through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to declare that “systemic rape” and “sexual enslavement” in conflict were second only to the war crime of genocide as crimes against humanity. Also facing the UN in the early 1990s, the gender-targeted crimes of Rwanda in 1994, in which brutal and often lethal rape was used as a tool by the ethnically homogenous Hutu perpetrators to both exhaust and demoralize their opponents, caused the SC to be heavily criticized by the international community for its lack of response. The crimes in Rwanda were significant also because Hutu women were noted as being complicit in the attacks, a fact that while not extensively addressed by either the UN or the SC, brings up issues of sexual violence in conflict as not merely a crime of gender, but as a crime of genocide.

The UN and the SC are in the current position of having learned from these incidences, and are now responding through a large and extensive body of policy. Through the Rome Statue of the ICC, rape, particularly in instances of genocide, has been officially recognized as a crime against humanity. Similarly, there has been a noticeable progression in SC documents to an increased awareness of both the presence and after-effects of sexual violence in conflict. Starting with SC resolution 1325 (2000) on “women, peace, and security,” the SC recognized the need to focus on the specific protection of civilian women and girls from gender-based crimes in conflict, and has called upon female representatives to be included with policy development addressing the “prevention and resolution of conflicts.” In 2009, the SC took another step forward from merely calling upon the protection of women and girls in conflict, by adopting resolution 1888, in which the Secretary-General was asked to appoint a special representative and team of experts to address gender-violence in conflict. Slowly, the field of gender-violence in conflict has been expanded from being simply a call for increased peacekeeping intervention, to a recognized and respected field of policy. This undertaking was reinforced in SC resolution 1960 (2013), which views parties who instigate sexual violence in conflict as legally responsible and also calls for the implementation of post-conflict programming for survivors of sexual violence in conflict. This shift, which has been increasingly emphasized over the past few years, has demonstrated an increased movement towards bottom-up policy approaches. These approaches rely on the personal accounts of individuals affected by the violence when addressing the needs of marginalized groups, as well as the recognition that physical security of women and children in conflict is not sufficient when addressing the entire scope of the impact of sexual violence.

Even with these monumental advances over the last two decades, the SC still has much room to grow in response to sexual violence in conflict. The recent crises of sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan have forced the SC to quickly examine the flaws in its existing policies prior to responding. Publically, the SC has been criticized for the reluctance of several permanent and elected Member States to take substantive action with regards to sexual violence and conflict. Additionally, there exists little or inconsistent legal recourse for instigators of sexual violence in conflict on a national level, and a related lack of international pressure to achieve such. Currently, all forms of legislative consequence for perpetrators occur through the lengthy and expensive criminal process at the ICC. Yet even this may not result in legal recourse, as seen through the recent acquittal of Germain Katanga, former leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri (present day DRC), with regards to sexual offenses. The lack of integration of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict with the SC has also been particularly criticized, particularly the recent issue where she was not aware of the mass rapes in the DRC until 10 days after UN peacekeepers discovered the incidents. Overall, sexual violence has only recently been mentioned in ceasefire mediation or documents, often existing merely as a footnote to other military concerns.

In terms of a purely logistical approach, the UN lacks a historical legacy of reports on the scale and form of sexual violence in conflict. With reports on these issues only recently becoming standard, the UN is aiming to reeducate military personnel on how to properly report and interpret sexual violence data. However, these new areas of training still utilize a top-down approach and tend to ignore the personal accounts of the survivors themselves. Linked to the issue of accurate reporting are the struggles faced by the UN, SC, and ICC in applying medical

evidence to these legal inquests in conflict areas to begin prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes. There has also been increased discussion of resource constraints for, and lack of awareness of the proper treatment of survivors. Finally, all of these reporting techniques are not yet required by UN military personnel, despite Human Rights Council (HRC) recommendations, and there are worries within the SC about the sustainability of holding relevant scenario-based trainings for military personnel with the rapid increase in prevalence that sexual violence in conflict appears to be experiencing.

On a micro-level, UN military personnel have only recently been trained to prioritize the protection of women and children when sexual violence occurs in conflict. Furthermore, this training has only been in terms of protecting the women and children from physical assault, while ignoring the importance of a recovery period and follow-up support for survivors of sexual violence. This post-conflict supplemental support is generally designated to the human rights bodies within the UN, such as the HRC and UN Women, or is delegated to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while UN military personnel remain relatively uneducated about the terminology and treatment necessary to directly aid sexual violence survivors. Similarly, the noticeably unequal gender balance within peacekeeping forces and the often hidden history of peacekeeping forces themselves engaging in sexual violence translates to UN peacekeepers who still struggle to gain local civilian trust; this is an integral part of meeting the peacekeeping goals for their mission and for general global peace and security. The medical and psychological support for survivors is therefore currently lacking, and while the recent increase in the recognition of the protection of women in conflict has been a positive step forward, other marginalized groups of victims, such as children, sexual minorities, and particularly male victims of sexual violence, lack both awareness and resources.

Moving to look at the issue outside of the logistical developments required to combat it, there exist larger thematic questions inherent within the concern of sexual violence in conflict that need to be substantively addressed by the international community. In general, the treatment of females that have experienced sexual violence in conflict has been based on the perception that they are “victims” in need of protection. Very little has been done by either the SC or even the UN as a whole with regards to preemptive, women-driven measures that empower other women to create policy or protect their own communities. Within the military, sexual violence has also been historically normalized. The addition of cultural components to instances of sexual violence also means that international attitudes around gender and ethnicity must be fundamentally shifted before sexual violence in conflict can truly be combated. These are immense issues that the SC will need to consider in all future policy deliberations, even if it may have reduced influence in these larger thematic areas when compared to its influence in the discussion of logistical advancements.

In conclusion, while the recent recognition by the international community of sexual violence in conflict as a pressing issue is a positive development, there is still significant room for advancement internationally before the issue can be considered stable and no longer a recognizable threat. Recent SC resolutions, from 2000 onwards, have displayed a gradual progression towards both recognizing the importance of the issue and the necessity of involving sexual violence survivors in the policy-creation process. However, this momentum must not be lost or pushed aside in favor of other priorities. If the international community’s fight to protect marginalized populations from violence is to be won, it is of the utmost importance that the SC acts as a united, substantive, and powerful voice against these crimes.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the United Nations Security Council

United Nations. (26 June 1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

There is no more comprehensive document to examine the mandates of both the UN and the SC. The Charter establishes the purpose and goals of the SC and states where limits on its power may lie. Articles 1 and 25, as well as Chapter VI, may prove particularly useful to delegates, as these chapters define how the SC implements legislative power in the international community, and they will enable delegates to research the source of the SC’s power and ability to create legally binding resolutions.

United Nations, Security Council. (2014). *About* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/> *The key Website to understanding the work of the SC, this site goes from explaining the basic mechanisms of the SC, including membership and presidency, to examining its overarching Programme of Work. Under the “Documents” section is the entirety of all previous SC resolutions and statements, including letters and press reports, which will prove highly useful to any research*

on the SC. Delegates should view the information about “Subsidiary Organs” and “Meetings” for the most recent information on the SC’s mandate and actions.

United Nations, Security Council. (18 June 2014). *Provisional Programme of Work of the Security Council – June 2014*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/powmonthly.pdf>

While short, this document shows the entire program of work and agenda of the SC throughout the month of June 2014. It provides reference to the consultations and briefings that have occurred with individual Member States and UN bodies, and also explains which reports will be published on which dates. Furthermore, this report lists the current areas of crisis and thematic debates occurring within the SC at this time. Delegates will find this very useful when studying the most current overall themes, policy developments, and collaborations between the SC and other UN bodies.

I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States

African Union, Peace and Security Department. (November 2010). *African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study*. Retrieved from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf>

This study essentially can be used as a progress report on the whole of the peace and security framework for the African Union. While the sections on the African Standby Force are especially relevant to this topic, the entire document will be a hugely useful and informative read for delegates in their preparation. Delegates should pay special attention to the challenges and subsequent recommendations outlined in each subsection mentioning the African Standby Force, and reflect on how it can apply to the SC and crisis management. Delegates should also be aware of an assessment report concerning the full operational capability of the African Standby Force in 2015, which will be prepared by an African Union independent panel of experts by July 2014.

Security Council Report. (May 2014). *Monthly Forecast: May 2014*. Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/2014_05_forecast.pdf

This Monthly Forecast publication is an extremely valuable resource for delegates to become acquainted with all the proceedings of the SC in one place. Not only does it provide snapshots of current situations that the SC is discussing, it outlines the probable outcomes of all pending resolutions, reports, and decisions. It is clearly organized and labeled, and offers an excellent starting place for research on any one of the topics being considered by the SC.

Thürer, D. (1999). The “Failed State” and International Law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 836. Retrieved from: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htm>

This article, while written 15 years ago and not directly from a security perspective, provides a good background of both failed and fragile states. It has solid narratives for the SC’s history with failed states that delegates may find useful to develop their background knowledge on the subject. The references section may also be a suitable location to find other leads on the subject for further study and research.

United Nations, Security Council, 7153rd Meeting. (10 April 2014). *Resolution 2149*. Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149(2014))

This resolution is the latest action from the SC on the subject of the CAR. Of particular interest are the operatives that detail the new Transitional Government in the CAR, as well as the transition from the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). Delegates should familiarize themselves with this resolution, as well as its counterparts, Security Council resolution 2158 of 29 May 2014 and Security Council resolution 2132 of 24 December 2013, relating respectively to the missions in Somalia and South Sudan, to be up-to-date on the failed or fragile nascent states in focus in this guide.

United Nations, Security Council, 7168th meeting. (2 May 2014). *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (S/PV.7168)* [Provisional Record]. Retrieved 27 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/>

[view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7168](#)

This is a verbatim meeting record of the SC's consideration of the situation in the Sudan and South Sudan. There is a first-hand report delivered in several speeches to the SC detailing the atrocities being carried out in South Sudan, as well as an in-depth update on the events that transpired at a UN peacekeeping base in the country. Delegates are encouraged to read as much of this record as they can, as it provides a different medium of conveying what is happening on the ground in a fragile nascent state.

II. Sexual Violence in Conflict

United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2014). *Stop Rape Now* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.stoprapenow.org>

As the key campaign behind the UN's current approach to sexual violence in conflict, this organization's Website includes not only the crucial documents influencing contemporary policy choices, but also field updates of the results of this policy. The section "Advocacy Resources" is also an extensive database of all documents within the past two decades addressing the issue, as well as all relevant SC resolutions and G8 declarations. There are also links to relevant NGOs, current news, and how civilians can take action on preventing sexual violence in conflict, which will prove useful in research on recent developments against sexual violence in conflict.

United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. (February 1994). *Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25years/content/english/CONCLUDING_COMMENTS/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina-Special_report.pdf

This document provides the earliest evidence of modern UN approaches to sexual violence in conflict by examining the failures and successes of peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through remarks by national representatives, these comments demonstrate that sexual violence is not merely a product of war, but a tool of it, which reveals the genocidal motivations of its perpetrators. This document is incredibly useful for research because it provides an early discussion of the post-war support required by survivors of sexual violence, including psychotherapy and reproductive health needs, which will likely be very influential in future policy development.

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2014). *Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/index.shtml>

While this Website deals specifically with the ramifications of the Rwandan genocide, it is notable for showing the evidence of a successful post-genocide violence in conflict program. Aside from detailed explanations of the program, there are extensive timelines and news updates of current events regarding both the survivors and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. Delegates should also seek out the site's extensive digital archive of related UN documents, and highly useful downloadable educational material, which should be greatly influential on all policy research.

United Nations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2014). *Sexual Violence in Conflict* [Website]. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/>

This Website provides the most up-to-date information on the current work of Zainab Bangura, the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. On top of her previous statements, it also provides videos and quotes from her current engagements, as well as present news updates. There are also links to related UN bodies that perform work with the Special Representative on sexual violence in combat issues. Delegates will find this site to have the most up-to-date archives on the Special Representative's recent work, as well as the most recent UN joint statements.

United Nations, Security Council, 6453rd meeting. (16 December 2010). *Resolution 1960*. Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1960\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1960(2010))

This is the watershed document behind the UN's current approaches to addressing sexual violence in conflict. The resolution calls for increased documentation of sexual violence in conflict and the related inclusion of recent field action on preventing sexual violence within UN documents. SC resolution 1960 is noted as being the most substantive document to date regarding sexual

violence, and will be useful for any research on this topic as it demonstrates the recent evolution of the UN's increased movement towards responsibility of sexual violence in conflict.